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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This dissertation investigates the relationship between economic growth and fossil 
fuel energy consumption through three interrelated chapters—each of which addresses a 
facet of the relationship. The first chapter argues that mainstream explanations for Industrial 
Revolution generally assign a pride of place to institutional—secure property rights—and 
technological innovations—the steam engine. Using interdisciplinary sources, this chapter 
shows that mainstream explanations are based on narrow empirics. More importantly, this 
chapter shows that switching from water to fossil fuel-based energy sources during the 
Industrial Revolution was not based on economic considerations since water was neither 
scarce nor more expensive than coal. Placing the Glorious Revolution on the same historical 
continuum as the Industrial Revolution—through their common link with the Enclosure 
Movement—this chapter argues that the real reasons behind switching to fossil fuels were 
political-economic.  
The second chapter argues that the relationship between economic growth and fossil 
fuel energy consumption has not been thoroughly investigated in the case of emerging 
 iv
economies. Building on the understanding obtained via economic history accounts, this 
chapter argues that the relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy 
consumption is structurally different in emerging economies. This chapter traces the linkages 
between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption in emerging economies, 
highlighting the role played by various economic, structural and technological factors. This 
chapter also shows that emerging economies—net energy importers, to be specific—face 
unique macroeconomic challenges in the shape of balance-of-payments crises and financial 
instability that stem from sudden and severe increases in their energy import bills.  
The third chapter empirically examines the relationship between economic growth and 
fossil fuel energy consumption growth in a sample of 35 net energy-importing emerging 
economies. Results show that in the sample of 35 emerging economies, economic growth 
Granger causes fossil fuel energy consumption growth in the period 1981-2013. Country-level 
scatter plots also indicate that in the sample of 35 emerging economies, the relationship 
between real GDP per capita and fossil fuel energy consumption per capita is linear when using 
K-Nearest Neighbor algorithm—and not curvilinear as postulated by the environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
BACKGROUND 
In 1991, upending the conventional understanding, two researchers reported a systematic 
inverted U-shaped relationship between environmental quality and income (Grossman & 
Krueger, 1991). Previously, it was believed that the rate of deterioration in environmental 
quality increased with income, meaning that as countries got richer they also became 
environmentally profligate. Previous understanding also indicated that safeguarding the 
environment was not possible without foregoing further industrialization. Grossman and 
Krueger pointed out, however, that environmental quality as gauged by pollutants like sulfur 
dioxide and other particulates, improved as consumption went up. In the years to come, this 
study initiated a line of academic inquiry regarding the relationship between environmental 
quality and income. This relationship came to be known as the environmental Kuznets Curve 
(EKC). 
 In the presidential address to the sixty-seventh Annual Meeting of the American 
Economic Association in 1954, Simon Kuznets had suggested that income inequality was a 
function of income and that as per capita income increased, income inequality initially 
worsened but eventually moved back to more equality beyond a threshold, thus exhibiting an 
inverted U-shaped relationship. This income-distribution relationship came to be known as 
the Kuznets Curve. After researchers argued for an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
environmental quality and income, the Kuznets Curve became a vehicle for describing the 
relationship between environmental quality and income. With slight modification, the 
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Kuznets Curve was converted into the concept of the EKC (Yandle, Vijayaraghavan and 
Bhattarai, 2002). The general form of the EKC is presented in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. The environmental Kuznets Curve (Source: Yandle, Vijayaraghavan & Bhattarai, 2002) 
 
The logic behind the EKC-hypothesis—U-shaped relationship between pollution and 
income—is intuitive enough. When economies are at low levels of per capita income they are 
usually in the pre-industrial or agrarian economic phase. As the process of industrialization 
gets under way, environmental degradation increases due to pollutants, the employment of 
relatively “dirty” technologies and due to the disregard for environmental consequences of 
growth. However, as economic growth continues, cleaner technologies and a shift to 
information and services-based production leads to actual improvement in the overall 
environmental quality.  
Decoupling or delinking the relationship between energy consumption and economic 
growth is a version of the EKC-hypothesis (Mazzanti, Montini & Zoboli, 2006; Semieniuk & 
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Mazzucato, 2016). The decoupling thesis postulates that, like the EKC-hypothesis, the rates 
of economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption, which may be measured as a proxy 
for income and environmental quality respectively, have begun to diverge with energy 
consumption slowing down in comparison to economic growth. In a sense, the decoupling 
hypothesis points towards a delinking between economic growth and fossil fuel energy 
consumption. In other words, even though the two variables have moved in lockstep 
throughout history, economic growth and energy consumption are now said to have 
“decoupled,” especially in the advanced economies. “In developing countries, some 
policymakers have interpreted the EKC/decoupling thesis as conveying a message about 
priorities: Grow first, then clean up” (Dasgupta, Laplante, Wang & Wheeler, 2002, p.147). 
The literature known as “Energy-GDP nexus” is composed of studies that have sought to 
assess the EKC/decoupling-hypothesis by carrying out tests of Granger causality.  
In the wider economic literature, there is no firm consensus on EKC. In a review 
article of 41 studies (Hervieux & Mahieu, 2014), a wide disparity was found between the 
inflection points—income level where pollution levels start to decline—ranging from $5,000 
per capita to $33,000 per capita (USD 2000). A significant number (3/4) of the studies 
reviewed did not find conclusive evidence to support the EKC hypothesis. 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This dissertation is an investigation into the relationship between economic growth and fossil 
fuel energy consumption in net energy-importing emerging economies. This dissertation will 
use both qualitative methods (historical studies) and quantitative methods (econometric 
analysis) as well as knowledge from other disciplines (history and political science, for 
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instance) to make an original contribution by investigating the reality and nature of 
relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption in net energy-
importing emerging economies. Specifically, this dissertation will trace the actual linkages 
between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption growth in a sample of 35 net 
energy-importing emerging economies. At the same time, this dissertation will conduct 
econometric analysis of the relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy 
consumption growth employing panel econometric techniques (Pedroni, 1999; 2004). 
Finally, this dissertation will use historical studies to show that it is all but impossible to 
entertain the possibility of a decoupling between economic growth and fossil fuel energy 
consumption in the net energy-importing emerging economies.  
The research results from this dissertation will assist policymakers in two main ways: 
First, highlighting the Granger causal mechanism between economic growth and fossil fuel-
based energy consumption growth will lead to better climate change mitigation policies. For 
instance, given the Granger causal linkages between economic growth and fossil fuel-based 
energy consumption growth, these findings will create the necessary urgency on part of 
policymakers to find ways to shift to a renewables-based energy system. Second, and most 
importantly, this dissertation will cast doubt on the validity of the EKC-hypothesis, especially 
in the context of 35 net energy-importing emerging economies. The implication here is that if 
there is a positive and significant Granger causal relationship between economic growth and 
fossil fuel-based energy consumption growth—meaning that economic growth Granger causes 
fossil fuel-based energy consumption growth—pollution intensity (a proxy for fossil fuel-
based energy consumption) is likely to keep growing in these 35 emerging economies for the 
foreseeable future. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Neoclassical Economics 
The EKC-decoupling hypothesis is closely connected to neoclassical economics. In 
neoclassical economics, economic growth models like Solow (1956) do not incorporate 
energy or resources as inputs. These models only use capital and labor as inputs. Neoclassical 
economists also argue that in the longer run, capital can be substituted for fossil fuel energy. 
Neoclassical economists argue that the elasticity of substitution between capital and fossil 
fuel energy is unity, or higher, (Solow, 1974), meaning that capital can serve as a substitute 
for fossil fuel energy. This line of work is interpreted to mean that substitution “...can 
effectively de-couple economic growth from energy and other resources. Depleted resources 
can be replaced by abundant substitutes, or by ‘equivalent’ forms of human-made capital 
(people, machines, factories, etc.)” (Stern & Cleveland, 2004, p.11; parentheses and quotes in 
original). In other words, neoclassical economic growth models assume that there are no 
natural or biophysical limits to economic growth.  
There is another strain of neoclassical economic growth models that argues that in 
addition to substitution, technological change can assist economies in overcoming any 
potential limits imposed by exhaustion of fossil fuels.1 Some economists (Maddison, 2001), 
while using labor productivity as a proxy for technological improvement, have shown that 
labor productivity has increased 15 times between 1870 and 2000 in the advanced economies 
of North America and Europe. Based on these trends in technological improvement, it is 
                                                 
1 When economists talk about technological change they are referring to increased 
productivity. It has been argued that the economic growth “miracle”—exponential improvement in 
quality of life since the Industrial Revolution—in North America and Europe is the result of 
improvements in technology. For a review, see Mokyr (ed.) (1999). 
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assumed that the technology frontier of North American and European economies will keep 
moving outward and thus, sooner than later, technology will produce a fossil fuel substitute. 
In this way, technology is widely believed to be able to solve the problem of limited 
resources as well as potential climate change soon—this idea is also known technological 
optimism. Specifically, Stiglitz (1974) showed that exogenous technological change would 
allow consumption to grow over time given that the rate of technological change divided by 
the discount rate was greater than the output elasticity of resources. With the advent of 
models of endogenous economic growth (Romer, 1990), an endogenous version of the same 
argument has also been advanced (Aghion & Howitt, 1998; Barbier, 1999).2 
 Based on these strains of neoclassical economics, it has been argued (Ayres & Warr, 
2009) that world economies, in general, and the United States, in particular, will enjoy 
perpetual economic growth. Ayres and Warr argue, however, that “[p]erpetual economic 
growth is an extrapolation from history and a pious hope for the future, not a law of nature. 
Yet few economists question it.” (2009, p.309). The scholars make an interesting remark 
pointing out that a significant number of economists speak in terms of awaiting a “recovery” 
with respect to the most recent economic crisis. Such terminology, according to the authors, 
indicates that in the minds of most economists the economy is only suffering from a 
temporary disequilibrium and that, sooner rather than later, economy will recover its long-run 
growth rate of three percent per annum. Specifically: 
                                                 
2 There is some evidentiary support for the theory that technological change, especially in the 
advanced economies of the “North,” can assist nations in overcoming the limitations imposed by 
nature. Product Life Cycle literature stresses the “... sustained product innovation in the North 
enables Northern workers to earn higher wages than comparable workers in the South” (Segerstrom, 
Anant & Dinopoulos, 1990, p. 1088; emphasis mine). For a review of Product Life Cycle literature, 
see: Cao, H. & Folan, P. (2012). 
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Governments, businesses and institutions are now, and have been for several decades, 
effectively addicted to the presumption of perpetual and inevitable economic growth. 
Any suggestion that growth might not continue indefinitely (or it may not be a good 
thing) is ignored or derided. Periods of recession are invariably regarded as 
exceptional. (Ayres & Warr, 2009, p. 309). 
 Ayres & Warr (2009) argue instead that “...future GDP growth is not only not 
guaranteed, it is more likely to end within a few decades. Indeed, we suspect that US national 
wealth has already peaked, and is now declining” (p. 309). Recently, some economists have 
endorsed the preceding view. Summers (2016), for instance, argues that reaching pre-crisis 
growth levels is not a given. Instead, chronically weak demand and anemic economic growth 
might well be the new economic reality. In other words, instead of returning to pre-crisis 
economic growth rates, world economies will likely be stuck with low economic growth rates 
for the foreseeable future. This is also referred to as “secular stagnation.” It should be noted, 
however, that though economists have begun recognizing the secular stagnating trends with 
respect to the economic growth, they still ascribe stagnating economic growth to a glut of 
savings as opposed to the “Limits to Growth” literature (Meadows et al. 1972). 
 
Political Economy   
Unlike neoclassical economics, economic historians approach the relationship between 
economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption in a different way. Economic history 
accounts that connect the Industrial Revolution—a proxy for economic growth—and fossil 
fuel-based energy consumption are part of a tradition initiated by the work of Arnold 
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Toynbee.3 Toynbee identified technological (steam engine, for instance) and institutional 
(division of labor, property rights etc.) innovation as the primary drivers behind the Industrial 
Revolution. Technology and institutions have been brought together in several accounts to 
explain the Industrial Revolution ever since. Barca (2011) cites the example of works that 
build on the Toynbee thesis by focusing on the technological and institutional ingenuity of 
Western societies in explaining differential economic growth outcomes between Western and 
non-Western societies. To quote Barca (2011, p. 1309; parentheses in original): 
A landmark in the field… D. Landes’ 2003 (1969) The Unbound Prometheus for 
example, launched a definition of the IR [industrial revolution] as the final victory of 
humanity… from the constraints of ‘natural’ conditions, thanks to new technologies 
and social values... 
These historical accounts usually forward the same core argument in that 
technological innovations such as the steam engine enabled human societies to switch to 
fossil fuels-based energy consumption (Smil, 1994). This energy switch liberated Western 
societies from energy constraints that had previously plagued pre-industrial societies and 
unleashed exponential economic growth. Wrigley (1988), for instance, compares Britain and 
the Netherlands to show that though exhibiting similarity in political and economic 
institutions, only Britain came to have a much bigger empire and market for its exports. 
Compared to the Netherlands, Britain was able to significantly enlarge its economic output 
since Britain had access to Welsh coal mines (Yergin, 1991). Allen (2009) also places 
technological innovation as the primary explanation of why the Industrial Revolution took 
off in Britain. Allen shows that as the ratio of wood price to coal rose with time, other 
                                                 
3Arnold Toynbee (1852-1883) was an economic historian. He is often confused with his 
nephew Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975), who was a universal historian. 
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nations, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, could not come up with technological 
innovations in industrial production that consumed energy substitutes like coal. Britain’s 
industries, however, were able to bypass energy constraints imposed on other nations’ 
industries since Britain was the first nation to effectively utilize its significant coal reserves 
through developing steam-based motive force at a commercial level (Smil, 1994).4 
At the same time, economic history accounts assert that institutional innovations like 
the establishment of Anglo-Saxon-style property rights removed persistent uncertainty and 
thus served to create an auspicious environment for economic growth. North and Weingast 
(1989), for instance, argue that the establishment of Anglo-Saxon-style property rights—or 
“credible commitments”—after the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 was the most important 
driver for putting Britain on the path to the Industrial Revolution and empire. In other words, 
“...the emergence of private property and the energy shift...have mutually reinforced each 
other, producing a unified and powerful narrative of techno-institutional supremacy as the 
main cause of economic growth in northern countries” (Barca, 2011, p. 1310). 
These preceding approaches, however, miss some important points. By focusing only 
on the technological innovation (Wrigley, 1988; Allen, 2009) such approaches lack 
accounting of the social and environmental costs that follow in the wake of economic 
growth. Wrigley, for instance, does not mention some of the glaring problems of using fossil 
fuels in agriculture like “...soil exhaustion and pesticide contamination to dependence on 
                                                 
4 Though actual numbers are not available, Coward (1994) has shown that most of the bigger 
coalfields in Britain started being utilized in the beginning of the seventeenth century. Rising coal 
usage was directly linked with the expansion of smelting of lead, copper and tin. This initial 
expansion of the metal smelting fueled by domestic coal laid the foundation of the development of the 
metal industry in Britain; a potential driver for the industrial revolution. 
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expensive industrial inputs and the need for subsidies on part of governments” (Barca, 2011, 
p.1310). To specifically quote Barca: 
Despite forming a substantial portion of the history of industrial societies, neither 
atmospheric pollution, local and global, nor living and working conditions in the 
coalfields and factories, nor ill-health and environmental degradation related to the 
extraction of mineral resources preoccupied the author... (p.1310–1311) 
Moreover, the focus on the institutional innovations like property rights—in the 
immediate aftermath of the Glorious Revolution—is treated as an analogous variable to the 
switch and exponential increase in energy consumption. In a sense, the two variables are 
interrelated and thus equally important in explaining the massive spurt in economic growth 
beginning with the Industrial Revolution. However, several problems follow from focusing 
on Anglo-Saxon-style property rights as quintessential institutional innovation: First, the 
assertion that Anglo-Saxon-style property rights lead to economic growth misses the 
important point that developing world inhabitants require completely different type of 
property rights (Bardhan, 2006). Even in the developed world, the efficacy of any form of 
property rights varies with a person’s socio-economic status; where big corporations consider 
“protection” from excessive taxation to be a property right, residents of the American inner 
cities might consider protection from a life of destitution as a legitimate property right.  
Second, historical approaches that focus on technological and institutional innovation 
do not focus on whether institutional innovation in the form of Anglo-Saxon-style property 
rights results in a pernicious impact on a region’s environment and ecology. There is plenty 
of evidence to support the assertion that establishing property rights is not always 
ecologically neutral. James Scott (1998) has shown that “scientific agriculture,” based on 
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Anglo-Saxon property rights regime, has been an unmitigated ecological disaster, especially 
in Africa. Moreover, Mathew Forstater (2002) has documented how the establishment of 
property rights led to the utter ecological ruination of the Maasai in East Africa. 
Third, another problem with historical accounts highlighting institutional innovation 
in the shape of Anglo-Saxon-style property rights is the glaring absence of a moral appraisal 
that must accompany any such account. For instance, questions regarding whether the 
establishment of property rights is just, fair or equitable are given short-shrift by historical 
approaches. Usually, the establishment of property rights for any one group entails 
dispossessing another group of its traditional rights of usage—or ownership. During the 
Enclosure movement in Britain, which was at its peak from 1760-1830, landowners fenced in 
commonly-farmed land, thereby pushing hundreds of thousands of rural dwellers towards 
urban centers in search of sustenance, thereby creating a major social upheaval (Polanyi, 
1944). 
In the final analysis, the preceding focus on Anglo-Saxon-style property rights has 
been interpreted as the shortest route to riches. This interpretation is a function of 
conceptualizing economic growth as a coordination problem—a Prisoners’ Dilemma Game. 
There is no mention of how the state is one of the more important variables in the process of 
economic growth (Amsden, 1997), or the fact that enforcement of property rights itself relies 
on the existance of a strong state, in the first place. This last point was underscored by even 
Adam Smith (1776) since, realizing the important role played by the state, he did not make 
an exclusive case for unfettered markets. Smith’s “invisible hand,” it has been argued, is 
firmly entrenched within the political institutions of the state (Blaug, 1997). 
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Ecological Economics 
Like neoclassical economics and economic history, ecological economics has a 
unique take on the relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption 
(Boulding, 1966; Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Daly, 1973). Ecological economists explain the 
relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption via the theory of 
energy in production; a theory derived from the laws of thermodynamics. According to the 
theory, production requires work, which can only be carried out by converting or 
transforming high-grade (low-entropy) energy such as carbon in fossil fuels through 
combustion into mechanical energy for moving a turbine (motive force). These 
transformations also result in by-products such as heat that are subsequently lost to the 
environment. This produced heat is low-grade (high-entropy) energy that cannot be re-used 
for any subsequent production.5 What this theory implies is that no matter how efficient a 
production process some amount of energy will always be lost to the environment. One 
corollary that follows is that requirements for continuous economic growth to provide for the 
rising living standards, especially in the emerging economies, will likely result in a 
significant increase in fossil fuel energy consumption. 
Ecological economists also question the way neoclassical economics explains the 
relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption. Stern (2010) 
shows that the neoclassical Cobb-Douglas production function can only argue against any 
limits to substitution between capital and energy if the actual elasticity of substitution 
between capital and energy is one or greater—if they are substitutes. However, if some 
amount of energy is always lost as heat then a production function with an elasticity of 
                                                 
5 Specifically, the second law of thermodynamics postulates that no production process is 
capable of recovering all the energy it uses.  
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substitution significantly less than unity—not a Cobb-Douglas production function—would 
be required to properly understand the relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel 
energy consumption. 
Limits to substitution between capital and fossil fuel energy also operate at the macro 
level, according to ecological economists. This, again, points out that there is no perfect 
substitution between capital and fossil fuel energy.  Stern (2010) explains how the 
construction, completion, operation and maintenance of various manufacturing operations 
require the expenditure of energy. “Similarly, humans that direct the manufactured capital 
consume energy and materials in the form of food, water and other subsistence needs” (Stern, 
2010, p.13). What this points out is that using additional manufactured capital as input—
assumption that capital and fossil fuel energy are substitutes—requires even more energy 
than before, thus pointing out that capital and fossil fuel energy are not substitutes but 
complements (Cleveland et al., 1984; Hall et al., 1986; 2003). Georgescu-Roegen’s (1976) 
fund-flow model describes production as a transformation process in which a flow of 
materials, energy, and information—the material cause—is transformed by human labor and 
manufactured capital—the efficient cause. Building on this, Daly & Cobb (1989) shows that 
merely increasing the number of pulp mills (efficient cause) does not produce an increase in 
pulp unless there is also wood fiber (material cause) to feed them. In other words, capital 
should be a poor substitute—if at all—for fossil fuel energy consumption (Stern, 2010, p.13). 
 Ecological economists’ pointing out that capital and fossil energy are not substitutes 
also raises a big question mark for the so-called technological optimists, who must assume 
that capital and fossil fuel energy are substitutes, before they even expatiate on the palliative 
properties of technological innovation. In the absence of elasticity of substitution being unity, 
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or higher, technological innovation alone cannot ensure that mankind is able to address 
threats emanating from climate change.6  
 
PLAN OF ARGUMENTS 
The preceding section reviewed the literature on how the relationship between economic 
growth and fossil fuel energy consumption has been explained as well as how extant 
explanations fall short. Considering these shortcomings, this dissertation seeks to investigate 
the relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption through three 
interrelated chapters—each of which addresses an important facet of the relationship. The 
chapter that follows starts with a major puzzle in economic history: why did the Industrial 
Revolution start in Western Europe? The chapter shows that mainstream explanations for this 
puzzle generally assign a pride of place to institutional—secure property rights—and 
technological innovations—steam engine. Using interdisciplinary sources, the first chapter 
argues that mainstream explanations are based on narrow empirics. At the same time, the first 
chapter argues that mainstream explanations generally emanating out of mainstream 
economics show philosophical ignorance in failing to provide a moral appraisal with respect 
to whether outcomes are fair, just or equitable. More importantly, the first chapter shows that 
during the industrial revolution switching from water to fossil fuel-based energy sources was 
not based on economic considerations since water was neither scare nor more expensive than 
                                                 
6 Scholars have questioned whether assuming continuous technological innovation is even 
warranted. Recently scholars (Gordon, 2016) have argued that labor productivity growth in advanced 
economies like the United States, which peaked in the 1950s, has slowed to a crawl since 1970. 
Gordon (2016), for instance, designates one hundred years between 1870-1970 as the “special 
century” and argues that “technological revolutions” that came about during this period will never be 
repeated. This pessimistic outlook regarding technological innovation puts scholars like Gordon 
squarely in the camp of “secular stagnation.” 
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coal. Placing the Glorious Revolution on the same historical continuum as the Industrial 
Revolution through their common link with enclosures, the first chapter argues that the real 
reasons behind switching to fossil fuels were political-economic. The energy switch was 
driven by the landlord/industrial class’s desire to maintain its bargaining power and the lion 
share of the surplus.  
The third chapter of this dissertation argues that the relationship between economic 
growth and fossil fuel energy consumption has not been thoroughly investigated in the case 
of emerging economies. Building on the understanding obtained via economic history 
accounts, the chapter argues that compared to advanced economies, the relationship between 
economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption is structurally different. The chapter 
traces the linkages between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption in 
emerging economies, highlighting the role played by various economic, structural and 
technological factors. The chapter also shows that emerging economies—net energy 
importers, to be specific—face unique macroeconomic challenges in the shape of balance-of-
payments crises and financial instability that stem from sudden and severe increases in their 
energy import bills.  
The fourth chapter investigates the relationship between economic growth and energy 
consumption growth in a sample of 35 net energy-importing emerging economies. Results of 
the short and long-run dynamics show that in the sample of 35 net energy-importing emerging 
economies, economic growth Granger causes fossil fuel energy consumption growth in the 
period 1981-2013. Moreover, country-level scatter plots indicate that in the sample of 35 
emerging economies, the relationship between GDP per capita and energy consumption per 
capita is linear when using K-Nearest neighbor algorithm for plotting—and not curvilinear as 
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postulated by the EKC-hypothesis. These findings indicate that in the presence of economic 
growth in emerging economies in the future, fossil fuel energy consumption growth is likely 
to keep increasing.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The decoupling hypothesis argues that economic reliance on fossil fuel energy consumption 
is ending. In other words, a veritable gap is opening between economic growth and fossil fuel 
energy consumption. This hypothesis is another version of the EKC literature, which 
postulates environmental pollution as a decreasing function of per capita income—as 
countries become richer, the overall pollution level decreases. However, there is not much 
evidence for the existence of decoupling/EKC relationship.  
To recap, neoclassical economics argues that given capital and fossil fuel energy are 
substitutes and that the standard Cobb-Douglas production function is able to fully capture 
the relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption.7 Moreover, 
EKC-hypothesis is the quintessential neoclassical argument as it argues for a de-coupling 
between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption owing to substitution between 
capital and fossil fuel energy through technological innovation.  
The relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption has 
also been explained through economic history accounts that underscore institutional and 
technological innovation. In different comparative studies, scholars show that innovations in 
institutions like the establishment of Anglo-Saxon property rights and innovations in 
                                                 
7 According to this view, fossil fuel energy is one of the inputs in the Cobb-Douglas 
production function having the form: Y=A F (L K E), where K is capital input, L is labor input and E 
is fossil fuel energy and Y represents the total production and A is the total factor productivity. 
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technology like the steam engine led to massive increase in fossil fuel energy consumption 
for industrial production, unleashing exponential economic growth that at least in the case of 
Britain was responsible for the Industrial Revolution and the British Empire.  
Ecological economists take issue with neoclassical economics assumption regarding 
substitution between capital and fossil fuel energy. Ecological economists point out that no 
matter how efficient a production process, energy is always lost and thus standard 
neoclassical production function cannot account for the relationship between economic 
growth and fossil fuel energy consumption. At the same time, ecological economists argue 
that capital and fossil fuel energy are, in fact, complements and the additional employment of 
capital inputs only leads to more fossil fuel energy consumption.  
The economic history approach was faulted for not accounting for the significant 
negative externalities that accompany the provision of property rights. Historical accounts 
shy away from providing a moral appraisal as well as do not document how the provision of 
property rights, at times, turns out to be an ecological disaster. More importantly, however, 
historical accounts do not take stock of the fact that the very act of establishing property 
rights is not possible without the political institutions of the state.  
Both neoclassical economics and economic history repose confidence in 
technological innovation. However, there are two main problems with this position. First, the 
efficacy of technological innovation in decoupling economic growth from fossil fuel energy 
consumption assumes that economic growth and fossil fuels energy are substitutes. This 
assumption has been shown to be tenuous, at best. Second, recently, it has been argued that 
the notion regarding human societies always pushing the technological frontier outward 
simply cannot be entertained. It should also be mentioned that neoclassical economics and 
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economic history point towards completely different conclusions about the relationship 
between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption. Where neoclassical 
economics entertains the possibility that economic growth can somehow continue without 
fossil fuel energy consumption—EKC/decoupling hypothesis—economic history suggests 
that sustained economic growth—like the Industrial Revolution—cannot take place without a 
fossil fuel-based energy system. 
This dissertation is an investigation into the relationship between economic growth 
and fossil fuel energy consumption in net energy-importing emerging economies. The 
dissertation uses both qualitative and quantitative methods as well as knowledge from other 
disciplines to make an original contribution towards furthering the understanding on the 
relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption. Through three 
interrelated chapters, this dissertation addresses three key themes in the relationship between 
economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption. The second chapter makes the case 
that an analysis of the relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy 
consumption is incomplete without an “energy systems” perspective. The third chapter 
presents the linkages between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption in 
emerging economies. Finally, the fourth chapter directly tackles EKC/decoupling hypothesis 
by analyzing the EKC/decoupling relationship for a subset of 35 net energy-importing 
emerging economies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FROM THE GLORIOUS TO THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOSSIL FUELS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the major puzzles in history is how nations of Western Europe initiated and sustained 
exponential economic growth, circa 1750, and why did non-Western nations largely miss out 
on this “Great Enrichment” (McCloskey, 2016). This economic growth spurt that began in 
Western Europe and later spread to North America, is also referred to as the Industrial 
Revolution.1 The improvements in the quality of life that came with the Industrial Revolution 
were “dramatic” (Harley, 1999). So much so that some experts have compared these 
improvements to the development of settled agriculture in the Neolithic period (Harley, 
1999). For instance, from time immemorial, there had existed an inverse relationship 
between real wages and population, meaning that real wages only rose when population 
declined for various reasons like the Black Death (Mokyr, 1999). Through the Industrial 
Revolution, which brought about factory production, the modern industrial city and the urban 
industrial proletariat, the inverse relationship between real wages and population was broken; 
real wages and population started rising in unison.  
 Using interdisciplinary sources—economics, history, human ecology, philosophy and 
political science—this chapter evaluates mainstream explanations for the exponential 
improvement in the Europeans’ quality of life. The chapter argues that mainstream 
                                                 
 1 The term “Industrial Revolution” first became popular after the work of Arnold Toynbee 
(1884). Along with economic impact, the Industrial Revolution also impacted a wide array of 
variables including “…attitudes, class consciousness, family life, demographic behavior, political 
power…” (Mokyr, 1999, p.7). 
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explanations are based on narrow empirics. At the same time, this chapter will also argue that 
mainstream explanations show philosophical ignorance in failing to provide a moral 
appraisal with respect to whether distributional outcomes are fair, just or equitable. The 
chapter first provides historical evidence to show that the Glorious Revolution as well as the 
Industrial Revolution were driven by the landlord/industrial class’s desire to maintain its 
bargaining power over the working classes. The chapter argues that throughout history, 
institutional and economic change cannot be understood without incorporating the political 
economy dimension.2 The chapter then examines two models to illustrate the singular 
importance of political economy: 1) Critical-Institutionalism 2) Fossil-Capital. Critical-
Institutionalism (Tauheed, 2013) explains the events of the Glorious Revolution through the 
interplay of the distribution of resources, culture and agency. Fossil-Capital (Malm, 2013) 
shows how due to political-economic considerations, fossil fuels became an integral part of 
industrial production in capitalist or monetary production economies. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The fact that some profound economic change happened in Britain around the middle of the 
eighteenth century is not in doubt. In economics, there is a wide consensus on the path-
breaking nature of the Industrial Revolution. One economic estimate shows that from 1750 
through 1870, British population grew from about 2.5 million to about 23.6 million—an 
increase of about 950%—whereas the per capita income in Britain grew from about $300 
                                                 
 2 The term “political economy” is used to refer to different approaches. In this chapter, 
political economy refers to the ontological embeddedness of politics-economics-society. Thus, the 
political economy approach taken in this chapter is concerned with the interplay between the 
mentioned trifecta in bringing about political, economic and social change. The ontological 
embeddedness of politics-economics-society also means that this chapter’s approach focuses on class 
conflict and the resulting distributional outcomes. 
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(U.S. 1970 $) to $900—an increase of about 300% (Harley, 1999).3 The singular importance 
of the Industrial Revolution can be adjudged from how it has been referred to in the 
literature. Joel Mokyr, who has conducted in-depth research on the economic history of 
Europe, refers to the Industrial Revolution as a “…technology-led quantum leap in economic 
growth…” (2016, p.257). Geoffrey Hodgson (2017a), who credited financial and 
administrative innovations for the significant economic growth, shows that during the 
Industrial Revolution, “…[s]ometime after 1700, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
began to take off in Europe…Western Europe GDP per capita was about 20 times greater in 
2003 than it was in 1700…” (p.2). McCloskey (2016), who has attributed changes in British 
society during the middle of the 18th century to the power of changing values, shows that due 
to the Industrial Revolution “…an increase of income per head in real terms since 1800 has 
been on the order of a factor of 20 or 30.” Swayed by these impressive economic growth 
numbers, perhaps, McCloskey has termed the Industrial Revolution the “Great Enrichment.” 
 Political scientists also concur with the seminal importance of the Industrial 
Revolution in putting Britain and Western Europe on a path towards prosperity. Douglass 
North and Barry Weingast (1989), comparing the contrasting fortunes of Britain and France 
in the 18th century, write “…[t]he contrast between the two economies in mid-century is 
striking: in 1765 France was on the verge of bankruptcy while England was on the verge of 
the Industrial Revolution” (p.831). Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) point out that the 
Industrial Revolution “…laid the foundations of prosperity we see in the rich countries of the 
                                                 
 3 Where real wages and population increased significantly, data suggesting actual 
improvements in standard-of-living is largely mixed. Mokyr (1999) summarizes both the “optimist” 
and “pessimist” estimates of the standard-of-living during the Industrial Revolution. There are no 
huge increases in overall consumption; biological indicators (mortality rates; height increases) also do 
not show stellar performance. However, pessimist scenarios are difficult to assess since it is difficult 
to calculate the economic value of path-breaking innovations like anesthesia during surgery. 
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world today” (p.84). Acemoglu and Robinson go on to refer to the period of the Industrial 
Revolution as a time when British state and society entered a “virtuous cycle” (2016).  
 Where there is a consensus on economic improvements during the Industrial 
Revolution, there is no agreement on why the revolution happened in the first place. Various 
schools across different disciplines emphasize different variables. The social change school 
focuses on the transformative impact of the emergence of “formal, competitive, and 
impersonal markets in goods and factors of production…” (Mokyr, 1999, p.7). Polanyi 
(1944) can be considered an adherent to this school since he judged the emergence of market 
economy to be a fundamental event. The industrial organization school focuses on the 
structure and scale of the firm as the relevant variable driving the Industrial Revolution. “The 
focal point is the emergence of large firms, such as industrial mills, mines, 
railroads…production was managed and supervised and…subject to discipline and quality 
control (Mokyr, 1999, p.7). Examples of this school include the works like that of Marglin 
(1974-75) as well as some those writers who, like him, have followed in the tradition of Karl 
Marx’s interpretation of the “Machinofactures.” Goldstone (1996), specifically, finds the 
reason behind the Industrial Revolution in the emergence of the factory system. Experts 
associated with the macroeconomic school focus on the aggregate variables like the growth 
of national income, capital formation and investment ratio (Rostow, 1960; Gerschenkron, 
1962). The technological school considers technology to be the primary driver behind the 
Industrial Revolution. The technological school scholars thus focus on technological 
innovation and the diffusion of new technological knowledge. Specifically, technological 
school scholars highlight the “discontinuities” that become apparent with respect to the 
explosion of patents around 1750s. The work of David Landes (1969) would be a good 
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representation of the technological school: “…[s]team and even more the clock, used as 
metaphorical symbols for a much larger complex of technological changes, transformed first 
Europe and then the world” (Landes, 1999, p.159). 
 Some approaches, however, do not fit neatly into the mentioned categories. New 
Institutional Economics (NIE, hereafter), an approach that identifies institutional innovations 
like secure property rights in England as the main driver behind the economic spurt, straddles 
both the social change as well as the technological school. For instance, Douglass North—
perhaps the most famous proponent of NIE4—like the social change school scholars, finds 
markets as important drivers of economic change.5 “North…followed Karl Polanyi and noted 
that the evidence of markets in Europe or the Middle East is in Athens about 2,500 years 
ago” (Hodgson, 2017a, p.4).6 At the same time, technological school scholars see themselves 
as extending NIE since technological innovations could not have come about in the absence 
of patents, or intellectual property rights (Mokyr, 1999). 
 
INSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS 
To explain the Industrial Revolution, scholars associated with New Institutional Economics 
(NIE, hereafter) go back in history to find the Revolution’s driving force in institutional 
innovations like the establishment of secure property rights after the Glorious Revolution in 
                                                 
 4 NIE proponents include Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson. However, per Hodgson 
(2017a), “With full justification, Bates (2014:50) wrote: ‘If anyone can claim to be the founder of the 
new institutionalism, it would be Douglass North.’” (p.2). 
 5 North highlights those institutional arrangements as drivers of economic growth that create 
an incentive for individual economic effort. Among these institutions, markets are but one 
institution—property rights are another. For the importance of markets in NIE, see North (1977). 
 6 It should be noted, however, that North provides a pride of place to secure property rights in 
his explanations since the formation of markets is not possible unless property rights have become 
secure. 
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Britain around 1688. Previously, the Original Institutional Economics (OIE) of Thorstein 
Veblen, John Commons and Wesley Mitchell was a prominent paradigm for understanding 
social change and institutions among American economists in the 1920s and the 1930s 
(Hodgson, 1989). However, where OIE scholars—Veblen’s critique of economic man as a 
“lightning calculator” (1919), for instance—had striven to reject the ontological foundations 
of neoclassical economics, NIE is focused on developing institutional theory that sits well 
with the ontological foundations of neoclassical economics. This conscious effort at 
incorporating the ontological foundations of neoclassical economics is also referred to as 
building on “microfoundations,” or the “fourth level of social analysis” (Williamson, 2000). 
According to Douglass North, NIE scholars “…incorporate a theory of institutions into 
economics…the new institutional economics builds on, modifies, and extends neo-classical 
theory to permit it to come to grips and deal with and entire range of issues…” (North, 1995, 
p. 17). North and Weingast (1989) is a quintessential NIE story in which the establishment of 
incentives in the shape of secure property rights after the “Dutch invasion” of 1688-89 put 
Britain on the path to prosperity, riches and empire (Hodgson, 2017b).  
Another approach that endogenizes the Industrial Revolution focuses on energy 
consumption. As economies grow so do their energy needs. Economies that can find 
additional sources of energy keep prospering; those which cannot falter. This approach is an 
extension of the technological school that highlights the role of technology in bringing about 
the Industrial Revolution, since exponential increases in energy consumption are always 
made possible by “macroinventions” such as the steam engine and mechanical spinning 
(Mokyr, 1999). It was only through the steam engine that British industry could convert 
thermal energy into kinetic energy, thereby converting heat into work so that wood and fossil 
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fuels could be used to produce motion. Wrigley (1988), for instance, compares Britain and 
the Netherlands to show that despite comparable political and economic institutions, only 
Britain came to have a much bigger empire and market for its exports. The driver behind the 
Industrial Revolution, in this case, was Britain’s ability to access Welsh coal mines (Yergin, 
1991)—something that could not have happened without the steam engine. Allen (2009) also 
places energy consumption as the primary explanation of why the Industrial Revolution took 
off in Britain. Allen shows as the ratio of wood price to coal rose with time, other nations, 
such as the Netherlands and Belgium, could not come up with technological innovations in 
industrial production that consumed energy substitutes like coal. Britain’s industries, 
however, could bypass energy constraints since Britain was the first nation to effectively 
utilize its significant coal reserves through developing steam-based motive force at a 
commercial level (Smil, 1994).  
 Despite different takes regarding the primary reasons behind the Industrial Revolution 
there is an over-arching theme in these explanations. These explanations regarding the 
Industrial Revolution generally follow in the tradition initiated by Arnold Toynbee.7 Toynbee 
identified institutional (division of labor, property rights etc.) and technological innovation 
(steam engine, for instance) as the primary drivers behind the Industrial Revolution.8 Thus, 
institutions and technology and have been brought together in a number of explanations to 
                                                 
7Arnold Toynbee (1852-1883) was an economic historian. He is often confused with his 
nephew Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975), who was a universal historian. 
 8 In this chapter, the highlighted overarching theme in Industrial Revolution explanations—
institutional and technological innovation—is not the Veblenian dichotomy between technology and 
institutions. “Veblenian dichotomy is the central analytical tool of institutional economists in the 
Veblen-Ayres tradition” (Waller, 1982, p.757). In the dichotomy, technological advance drives 
change, while extant social institutions preserve the status quo. “Together, the opposing forces of 
institutions and technology determined the nature of socioeconomic and cultural change” (Forstater, 
2007, p.104). 
  26
explain the Industrial Revolution.9 Barca (2011) cites the example of  various works that 
build on the Toynbee thesis by focusing on the institutional and technological ingenuity of 
Western societies in explaining differential economic growth outcomes between Western and 
non-Western societies. Specifically, “…[p]robably the most influential example of this line 
of explanation in the last decades has been that elaborated by…Douglass North and Robert 
Thomas in their theorization of the ‘rise of the western world’…[in which] the authors 
defined modern growth as the ‘break of the Malthusian trap’, and ascribed it to institutional 
changes ‘which by incentive direct man's efforts towards technological change and sustained 
productivity growth…’ (Barca, 2011, p.1310).  
 Thus, the mainstream understanding of why the Industrial Revolution happened 
usually advances the same core argument that focuses on institutional and technological 
innovation. As mentioned above, Wrigley (1988) compares Britain and the Netherlands to 
show that economic gains associated with the Industrial Revolution would not have been 
possible without technological innovation. Allen (2009) also places technological innovation 
as the primary explanation of why the Industrial Revolution took off in Britain.10 At the same 
time, economic history accounts assert that institutional innovations like the establishment of 
Anglo-Saxon-style property rights removed persistent uncertainty and thus served to create 
an auspicious environment for economic growth. North and Weingast (1989), for instance, 
argue that the establishment of Anglo-Saxon-style property rights—or “credible 
commitments”—after the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 was the most important driver for 
                                                 
9 For a review, see Greif & Mokyr (2016). 
10 Though actual numbers are not available, Coward (1994) has shown that most of the bigger 
coalfields in Britain started being utilized in the beginning of the 17th century; rising coal usage was 
directly linked with the expansion of smelting of lead, copper and tin.  
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putting Britain on the path to the Industrial Revolution and empire. In other words, “...the 
emergence of private property and the energy shift...have mutually reinforced each other, 
producing a unified and powerful narrative of techno-institutional supremacy as the main 
cause of economic growth in northern countries” (Barca, 2011, p. 1310). 
 
THE PAUCITY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS APPROACH 
Despite other forms of institutional innovations, NIE scholars end up providing pride of place 
to secure property rights. For instance, North and Weingast (1989) make a case for the state 
to credibly commit against arbitrary taxation through enforcing secure property rights since 
secure property rights provide the best protection against potential predation by the state. 
However, there are several problems with this line of reasoning. For starters, it is not entirely 
clear if the claims put forth in North and Weingast (1989) regarding property rights are 
factually correct. Hodgson (2017b) disputes there were any significant changes in the 
property rights regime in Britain after the Glorious Revolution since property rights were 
already “relatively secure” in England since the 13th century. Hodgson ascribes the 
improvements in living standards to the needs of war and Britain’s expanding global role. 
McCloskey (2016) also questions the focus on property rights since she argues that the 
property rights regime did not change in England for at least two hundred years between 
1630-1830.  
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Second, NIE-type explanations miss the larger point that people in developing 
countries, at times, require completely different type of property rights (Bardhan, 2006).11 
The type of property rights being promoted in NIE are the Anglo-Saxon-style property rights 
that establish asset or land ownership through titles and deeds. In so doing, NIE’s promotion 
of secure Anglo-Saxon-style property rights misses the reality of life in many developing 
countries, where people, lacking asset or land ownership, require completely different type of 
property rights —a micro-enterprise owner in a peri-urban area in South Asia may require 
protection from extortion by the local goons (Bardhan, 2006).12  
Another omission in the NIE literature is the absence of any recognition of whether 
establishing property rights, the reason behind the Industrial Revolution and thus the 
prescribed policy for emerging economies, results in pernicious side effects on a region’s 
ecology. There is plenty of evidence to support that establishing property rights is not always 
ecologically neutral. James Scott (1998) has shown that “scientific agriculture” based on the 
modern property rights regime has been an unmitigated ecological disaster in Africa. 
Moreover, Mathew Forstater (2002) has documented how the provision of property rights led 
to the utter ecological ruination of the Maasai in East Africa. Forstater shows how attempts at 
establishing property rights by the colonial and post-colonial regimes of Kenya and 
                                                 
11 This point is significant with respect to economic development policy emanating out of 
international financial institutions like the World Bank for emerging economies since “North has also 
had an important policy influence over the World Bank and other major institutions involved in 
economic development” (Hodgson, 2017, p.2). 
 12 The attractiveness of any form of property rights varies with people’s differing socio-
economic status—where big corporations consider protection from excessive taxation as property 
rights, micro-enterprise owners see protection from extortion as property rights.  
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Tanzania, reduced the Maasai to be only able to sell the bones of their dead cattle since most 
of their livestock had perished in repeated droughts.13  
A fourth issue pertains to NIE’s philosophical ignorance with respect to the moral 
dimension of establishing property rights—whether establishing property rights is just, fair or 
equitable. Usually, establishing secure property rights for one group entails dispossessing 
another group of its traditional rights of usage or ownership. Schneider and Nega (2016) have 
underscored the ethical lacunas in fairly assigning property rights in Africa. “Some of the 
most productive members of society, particularly women, tend to be excluded from 
government efforts to extend formal property rights to communal lands” (p.437). As such, 
NIE’s lack of a moral appraisal is part of a bigger problem in mainstream economics that 
largely eschews philosophical questions (Fine, 2004; Nussbaum, 2016).14 Such philosophical 
ignorance, where it can result in unjust outcomes, is deeply troubling since mainstream 
economics extant theory of income distribution—marginal productivity—is under severe 
pressure given the secular slowdown in productivity.15 Thus, in re-examining extant theories 
of income distribution economics needs to look at philosophical questions such that the cause 
of justice can be advanced in advanced economies like the United States. At the same time, 
given NIE’s global policy ambit, both NIE, as well as mainstream economics, need to engage 
                                                 
 13 Since the establishment of secure property rights is often part of a larger project of letting 
the Invisible Hand operate unimpeded, works by ecological Marxists like John Bellamy Foster would 
also be relevant here. Ecological Marxists have linked long-term ecological decline with capitalism. 
For a summary, see Lynch (2016). 
 14 Fine (2004) finds economics failing badly in the ethical dimension for six reasons: 1) rigid 
positive v. normative distinction; 2) poor methodology; 3) neglect of its own discipline history; 4) 
isolation from other social sciences 5) intolerance of heterodox versions of economics; 6) lacking in 
meaning and implications. 
 15 In the last 13 years, for instance, productivity has grown at an anemic 1.4%, well below the 
2.2% long-run trend since the Second World War (Source: Business Insider, September 14, 2016). 
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in philosophical questions in order to “…develop adequate theories of global justice and the 
obligations of richer to poorer nations” (Nussbaum, 2016, p.236). 
A fifth problem with NIE is the way in which the promotion of secure property rights 
is touted as a solution to the problem of coordination since NIE conceptualizes the economic 
growth during the Industrial Revolution as a coordination problem—a Prisoners’ Dilemma 
Game. Without property rights, NIE argues, human existence remains beset with the “tragedy 
of the commons” (Hardin, 1968), whereby individuals “...pursue their private objectives to 
disastrous consequences for themselves and others” (Bowles, 2006, p.27). There are two 
main ways in which property rights are said to help with providing a channel to economic 
development. First, it is argued that property rights provide an external enforcement 
mechanism through which economic agents can reach and remain at the Pareto-optimal 
equilibrium, as opposed to being doomed to the Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium. The second 
way in which property rights are said to save the day with respect to economic development 
follows from changing the very nature of the process of economic growth from a prisoners’ 
dilemma to what Samuel Bowles has termed the “Invisible Hand Game.” In the Invisible 
Hand Game there exists a single Nash equilibrium that is also Pareto-optimal, thus in a two-
person game “...the self-interested actions of both actors yield an outcome that maximizes the 
well-being of each” (Bowles, 2006, p.41). Two main issues follow: First, providing secure 
property rights is simply not possible unless an individual or an organization can monopolize 
the use of violence.16 For unless the capacity to undertake violence can be monopolized 
through state formation, un-ending violence between warring factions, clans or tribes in a 
Hobbesian “state of nature” would ensure that not even the idea of property rights exists. 
                                                 
 16 This idea refers to a popular definition of the “state” in political science and sociology. It 
comes from Max Weber’s essay titled “Politics as a Vocation,” (Weber, 1919/1946). 
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What may belong to one clan today might end up belonging to another faction tomorrow. In 
a sense, the purported solution to the coordination problem of economic growth in the shape 
of secure property rights is by itself a coordination problem—establishing secure property 
rights is a nested prisoners’ dilemma since the formation of a state must precede the 
establishment of property rights. In political science, nested prisoners’ dilemmas are studied 
through the so-called sequencing debate that analyzes whether state formation happened 
before the formation of democracy or democratic institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2016). In other words, what is being claimed as a solution to the problem of coordination is 
dependent on the state for enforcement, while the coordination problem inherent in state 
formation is not addressed. 
 The second issue stems from the plethora of evidence from the field of political 
science that points in the opposite direction as opposed to what we are being told by the NIE. 
Even if we accept property rights as coordination mechanisms, the efficacy of the state as a 
superb coordination mechanism cannot be ignored. The East Asian state, for instance, played 
a significant coordinating role in setting the region on the path towards economic growth. 
The East Asian state intervened in the capital markets to regulate credit allocation to 
designated “winners,” promoted industrial investment, underwrote risks and guaranteed loans 
and established public development banks, to name a few policy steps (Amsden, 1989).  
Schneider and Nega (2016) have also criticized NIE for ignoring the state as an important 
variable, at least in the case of the developing world. The authors analyze policy 
prescriptions for Africa emanating from NIE and find that the NIE remains a supply-side 
approach that promotes the private sector ‘…over demand considerations and the public 
sector’ (p.441). In their own words: “Viewing the state primarily as an impediment to 
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development is problematic. There are almost no instances of late-industrializing countries 
succeeding without substantial state intervention, so it makes little sense to continue to 
deemphasize state-led development” (Schneider and Nega, 2016, p. 441).  
 
PROBLEMS WITH TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS APPROACH 
As mentioned in the previous section, one of the main approaches that endogenizes the 
Industrial Revolution focuses on fossil fuel energy consumption. This approach is an 
extension of the technological school, since exponential increases in energy consumption 
were always made possible by “macroinventions” such as the steam engine and mechanical 
spinning (Mokyr, 1999). Before the Industrial Revolution, it is argued, the British economy 
operated within a “Ricardian-Malthusian,” or a classical economics, paradigm. In a Ricardian 
sense, all raw materials for economic production were physically drawn from the land. Also, 
all energy required for economic production was derived from photosynthesis. Like land, the 
yield from photosynthesis was limited, by the supply of land, which, in turn, could not be 
increased. Thus, pre-industrial British economy was an “organic economy,” where due to the 
limitations of a Ricardian-Malthusian paradigm, diminishing returns were a foregone 
conclusion.  
 Wrigley (1988; 2010) argues that the Industrial Revolution is a story of an energy 
transition from an “organic” to an “energy-rich” economy. Circa 1750, with recourse to fossil 
fuels like coal, British economy was finally able to break the Ricardian-Malthusian paradigm 
as economic production was no longer beholden to the availability of wood and charcoal—
products of photosynthesis. Wrigley (2010) contrasts the case of Britain with the Netherlands 
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where “…despite the onset of economic modernity, industrialization was impossible without 
access to an appropriate energy source” (Attard, 2012).  
 Before the advent of fossil fuels in British industrial production, the dominant 
industrial energy source in Britain was water—not wood or charcoal. In 1800, for instance, 
there were over one thousand water wheels in the British cotton mills as compared to only 84 
Boulton & Watts steam engines. Through the 1830s there was continual increase in the 
number and size of water wheels employed in the British industry as “…[w]ater remained the 
foundation for the capitalist factory system…wheels were enlarged and perfected 
[and]…new and extended mills…equipped with latest wheels-models of gargantuan 
dimensions (Malm, 2013, p. 27). In a sense, industrial production in Britain was not 
constrained within a Ricardian-Malthusian paradigm. The ubiquitous reliance on the water 
wheel has also been noted by scholars, who have argued that Europe was going through a 
“hydraulic revolution” by the 13th century (Debeir, Deleage & Hemery, 1991). Thus, even if 
Wrigley’s thesis regarding the Industrial Revolution being the story of exponential energy 
consumption is accepted, it does not explain why the British economy turned towards fossil 
fuels like coal instead of enhancing the already existing renewable sources of energy like 
water? To understand why this energy switch to fossil fuels took place in Britain, two 
important questions need to be answered: 
  First, could it be the case that by the 1830s, Britain was suffering from elevated levels 
of water scarcity that might have prompted British industrialists to move in the direction of 
fossil fuel-powered steam engines? Gordon (1983), while documenting the total usage of 
various water reservoirs in Britain, found evidence that was not consistent with the water 
scarcity hypothesis— Britain was using only a minute fraction of all available water. What 
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this points out is that additional water power could have easily been developed as an energy 
source for British industry. 
 Second, were the running costs for steam engines lower than water since a cost 
advantage could have tipped the British industrialists’ hand in favor of fossil fuel-powered 
technology? To answer this question a cost comparison between water and fossil fuel-based 
energy production is required. Both water wheels and steam engines required significant 
capital expenditure. In the case of water wheels, the wheel had to be constructed and placed 
in a “wheel-house.” At the same time, a system of conduits had to be constructed to channel 
water to the wheel along with a dam for storing water. In the case of steam engines, metals 
like brass, copper and iron were required for constructing the pipes and the boiler. This 
process called for significant expenditure in the shape of specialized paraphernalia and 
skilled labor. However, in terms of day-to-day running costs, water wheels were cheaper per 
horsepower generated as once the lease to a certain stream had been acquired, marginal costs 
associated with running a water wheel were essentially negligible (Malm, 2013). In the case 
of steam engines, marginal costs were significant as coal had to be continually purchased and 
transported to the factories. Again, what this points out is that additional sources of water 
power could have been developed relatively cheaply and that there is no obvious business 
case for the fossil fuel turn in British industrial production.  
 All in all, what the preceding points show is that “…[t]he transition from water to 
steam in the British…industry did not occur because water was scarce…or more expensive 
than steam. To the contrary, steam gained supremacy in spite of water being abundant, at 
least as powerful, and decidedly cheaper (Malm, 2013, p. 31, italics in original). Malm 
(2013) rightly points out that the abundance of water as well as its relative lower economic 
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cost only deepen the mystery with respect to the British industry’s turn towards fossil fuels. 
These facts force one to wonder whether the switch from water to fossil fuel-based energy 
system was “irrational,” “…or did it have another rationale, a different set of causes, hidden 
beneath the immediately visible differentials in economic and technological benefits (Malm, 
2013, p.7)?” 
 According to Malm (2013), the reasons behind the British industry’s shift from water 
wheels to the steam engines were political—not economic. Because water wheel technology 
relied on finding appropriate water falls to generate motive force, water wheel technology 
exhibited a “centrifugal” tendency, meaning that British industrial production was 
continually spreading out into the countryside. At times, the right water sources were in areas 
that were not close to settlements. Whenever this happened, most of the labor had to be 
imported from industrial cities like Glasgow, London and Manchester. To house the workers, 
industrial colonies had to be set up that required significant amounts of investment. Despite 
these fixed overheads, water wheel remained the preferred choice of British industry since 
profits were high due to negligible cost of running day-to-day production.  
 The repeal of Combination Laws in 1824, outlawed collective bargaining rights for 
the British workers; labor was no longer allowed to protest, strike or picket. These political 
steps, unambiguously designed to weaken the working classes, instead led to an explosion of 
strikes and union activism across Britain. Explosive union activism had a direct negative 
impact on British industries’ profit margins and bottom lines, thus forcing them to re-
evaluate their business strategies. British industry came up with a two-pronged strategy: 
First, British industry moved away from water-based energy production, so fixed overheads 
with respect to building labor colonies could be saved—this step assisted with maintaining 
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the profit margin. Second, British industry moved towards employing more steam engines by 
physically moving towards urban centers in Britain. This step provided the opportunity to 
control labor through hanging the sword of potential unemployment over the working 
classes—unemployment took on a “functional” quality. In its desire to control labor, British 
industrial production, which had exhibited a centrifugal dynamic—spreading out into the 
country side—took on a more centripetal dynamic as industrial production started relocating 
to the urban centers. In other words, “…[w]hat had happened by the 1830s was clearly not an 
exhaustion of the potentials of water power, in physical, technological or strictly economic 
terms. Instead, capitalist development had reached a point where the greatest advantage of 
steam power—its mobility in space—overrode all other concerns” (Malm, 2013, 39). 
 Union activism successively increased in the early decades of the 19th century. To 
forestall an open rebellion by the working classes, the British government decided to address 
working conditions through the Factory Act of 1833. Through the Factory Act 1833, 
“[e]mployment of children below the age of nine was banned in textile factories, while the 
working day was limited to eight hours for children up to 13 and to 12 hours for ‘young 
persons’ up to 18” (Malm, 2013, p.44). These political steps to provide a modicum of 
protection to the interests of the working classes was perceived as a frontal attack by the 
British industrial class. Instead of giving in to the rising tide union activism and “labor-
friendly” legislation, the British industrial class decided to fight back. Malm (2013) cites 
evidence to show how blatantly these legislative efforts were flouted as British industrialists 
worked factory workers much harder than before. Finally, the British state in 1848 capped 
the working day through the universal Ten Hours Act. Again, refusing to compromise on 
their profit margins and bargaining power, British industry started shifting en masse in the 
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direction of steam engines to wrest more control from the ascendant working classes by 
relocating to the industrial centers, where unemployment could take on a functional quality. 
 Support for Malm’s thesis comes from a world-systems model developed by Bruce 
Podobnik (1999; 2002; 2006).17 To explain how global energy shifts—shift from one energy 
source like wood to another energy source like coal—come about, Podobnik (2006) forwards 
a world-systems perspective. Like Malm, Podobnik locates the genesis of a coal-based 
energy system, albeit globally, in overtly political drivers: Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In 
1648, European states agreed to the principle that states were separate political entities and 
thus had sovereignty over their respective territories. The peace of Westphalia also stipulated 
that conflicts between sovereign states were not to be visited upon civilian commercial 
interests. This treaty, according to Podobnik, laid the necessary foundation for a coal-based 
system to take off—massive investments for building a coal-based energy system were 
required—as capital could now move freely between international borders. According to 
Podobnik, “…growth in global energy systems [is] achieved…when a hegemonic state is 
able to contain…geopolitical, commercial and social competition... Conversely…change in 
global energy systems occur when hegemonic stability breaks down…” (2006, p.9). In other 
words, the establishment of a coal-based energy system in Britain was intricately linked with 
transnational capital that was made possible by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 
   The transition to coal-based industrial production in Britain cannot be explained by 
technological innovation, argues Podobnik. Podobnik’s model to explain the emergence of a 
                                                 
 17 World-systems analysis is a heterodox (Marxian) approach for understanding the global 
patterns of economic and political power as well as domination. It is different from orthodox 
Marxism in two main ways: First, it backdates the origins of capitalist system to the 16th century. 
Second, world-systems argues that capitalism gives rise to various labor relations as opposed to the 
“…Marxian account of the emergence of capitalism as an economic system” (Babones, 2015, p.4). 
For an overview, see Babones (2015). 
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coal-based energy system in Britain contains four interacting components that together 
explain the energy shift to coal during the Industrial Revolution. The first component in 
Podobnik’s model is geopolitical rivalries that can fluctuate between intense and moderate 
conflict. Second component in this world-systems model is corporate competition that also 
alternates. Third component in this model is the social conflict taking place overall and this 
can vary between radical and moderate intensity. The fourth and final component in the 
model is an interactive variable called hegemonic sequence that is composed of the 
interactions of geopolitical rivalry, corporate competition and social conflict.  
 Specifically, Podobnik highlights three broad variables—geographic factors; crucial 
social transformations; advantageous position in global trade—to explain why a coal-based 
energy system developed in Britain. The influx of profits from Atlantic Trade as well as the 
conquest of India enabled the British state to pay down its international debt, thereby 
reducing domestic interest rates. This reduction in domestic interest rates also reduced the 
borrowing cost of domestic capital, which was a crucial ingredient in expanding 
transportation infrastructure for coal. In terms of social transformations, enclosures of rural 
land, that took on a renewed phase of expansion circa 1750, were crucial, argues Podobnik. 
Britain “…underwent a process of proletarinization in the middle of the 18th century that 
fostered growth in the coal industry…mine owners were able to gain access to a new pool of 
labor…” Thus, Podobnik concurs with Malm (2013) in identifying the availability of cheap 
labor in British industrial centers as the very reason why industrial production started 
becoming concentrated in the cities.  
 Vaclav Smil (1994), an interdisciplinary scholar, takes issue with the very use of the 
term “Industrial Revolution” and argues that the process of enlarging industrial output in 
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Britain was much more gradual.18 Moreover, Smil points out that the process of economic 
growth in Britain was complex and truly evolutionary—meaning that the process is not 
linear. What this means is that the British experience cannot be extrapolated to other nations 
since “[t]o view the worldwide industrialization process largely as imitative waves of English 
developments (Landes 1961) is…misleading” (Smil, 1994, p.192; parentheses in original).  
 Importantly, Smil provides an important ethical corrective to accounts that see the 
Industrial Revolution as a story of a shift from an “organic” to an “energy-rich” economy. 
Smil believes that though the amount of energy available to a society invariably determines 
the scope of that society’s action, it tells us precious little about a society’s basic economic 
accomplishments or its ethos. Smil likens narratives that provide a pride of place to energy 
consumption in explaining economic outcomes to energy determinism. Smil points out that if 
we were to equate the quality of life with material possessions, only then could an 
explanation based on energy consumption gain traction. “But such a primitive perspective 
excludes the multitude of moral, intellectual and esthetic values whose inculcation, pursuit 
and upholding have no links to any particular level of energy use” (Smil, 2004, p.559). 
Timeless artistic expression and ideals, for instance, show no correlation with energy 
consumption. “[A]ll universal and durable ethical precepts, be they of freedom and 
democracy or compassion and charity, originated in antiquity when an inadequate and 
inefficient energy supply was but a small fraction of today’s usage” (Smil, 2004, p.559).  
                                                 
 18 “Vaclav Smil does interdisciplinary research in the fields of energy, environmental and 
population change, food production and nutrition, technical innovation, risk assessment, and public 
policy. He is a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of Manitoba and a Fellow of the 
Royal Society of Canada…” Source: vaclavsmil.com. 
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 To be sure, Smil points out, that given the complex nature of modern economies and 
high correlations between economic output and energy consumption, it is possible that the 
causal arrow goes from economic output to energy consumption and not vice versa. He 
rightly points out that the availability of domestic energy resources has never been any 
guarantee for a country’s economic success. At the same time, the absence of domestic 
energy resources also does not preclude economic growth. Several energy-poor countries 
headed by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have done well economically. At the same time 
where societies do need an energy minimum to enjoy a decent quality of life, effective public 
policies can ensure the enjoyment of large rewards not much above the minimum amount of 
energy required to enjoy a decent life (Smil, 2004). 
 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOSSIL FUELS 
The preceding sections expose several lacunas in that the mainstream explanations of the 
Industrial Revolution. To recap, the mainstream explanations of the Industrial Revolution 
argue that the exponential economic growth that began in Britain, circa 1750, was largely the 
result of institutional and technological innovations. In these mainstream explanations, the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 is identified as a seminal event that brought about significant 
institutional innovations including the establishment of secure property rights. Based on this 
case, policy makers associated with International Financial Institutions have consistently 
advised emerging economies to strengthen their property rights regime. However, there are 
significant issues with this claim, including the fact that the establishment of secure property 
rights after the Glorious Revolution was not de novo; property rights was already secure in 
Britain for at least two hundred years prior to the Glorious Revolution. At the same time, 
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these mainstream explanations involving institutional innovation provide short shrift to 
ecological and ethical questions. One significant issue in these narratives is the way 
institutional innovation in the shape of secure property rights is touted as a self-enforcing 
mechanism that all but makes the state superfluous. This is a puzzling claim since economic 
development in non-European societies—East Asia, for instance—has shown that the state, 
or the political dimension, figures very largely in the process (Amsden, 1989). 
 On the technological innovation front, scholars argue that the story of the Industrial 
Revolution is a story of technology-enabled exponential energy consumption that essentially 
transformed an “organic” British economy to an “energy-rich” one. The problem with such 
explanations is that they gloss over important details. For instance, prior to the turn to fossil 
fuels, water-based energy was the mainstay of the British economy. At least through 1830s, 
water-based technology was neither scare nor more expensive than coal. In fact, the primary 
drivers behind the fossil fuel turn in Britain were political; steps taken by the British 
industrial class to dominate the working classes in face of successively increasing union 
activism. This was largely achieved by moving industrial production to urban centers, where 
a surplus of available labor lent employment a “functional” quality. Some other scholars have 
forwarded a world-systems perspective that connects the energy switch in Britain to political 
decisions dating to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Like institutional innovation, these 
narratives do not address some important questions like is “economic growth a story of 
energy consumption or is it the case that the causal arrow goes from economic growth to 
energy consumption and not vice versa?” 
 Given the lacunas in mainstream explanations about the Industrial Revolution and the 
crucial nature of political considerations in shaping both institutions and technology, it is 
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imperative to re-assess how the process of economic growth got under way in Britain. This 
chapter presents two methods of re-assessing historical events. Both these methods are part 
of the same historical continuum since events at the end of the Glorious Revolution led 
directly into the Industrial Revolution. The first method—Critical-Institutional—develops an 
explanation for the Glorious Revolution. The second method—Fossil-Capital—shows how 
modern economic growth came to be inextricably linked with the consumption of fossil fuels. 
 
CRITICAL-INSTITUTIONALIST THEORY OF THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION 
Unlike methodologically individualist mainstream approaches, critical-institutional analysis 
relies on methodological holism as one of its ontological foundations. This enables critical-
institutionalist method (Tauheed, 2013) to incorporate the interplay of resource structure, 
culture and human agency. Tauheed (2013) builds a usable definition of culture to include 
“…technology (‘tools and skills’) and its ‘symbols, stories, rituals and world-views,’ all 
developed from collective experience in past problem solving (2013, p.7, parentheses and 
quotes in original).”  At the same time, resource structure is defined as “…the distribution of 
resources to agents as an outcome of past social action (Tauheed, 2013, p.7).” The idea here 
is that with resource structure we want to capture the actual distribution of resources that is 
available to different agents at any given time. Finally, Tauheed defines agency as “…the 
degree of awareness people have of their power to interact with and to re-make their social 
environment to suit their needs” (p.7). 19 
                                                 
 19 Agency is a ‘psychological construct’ that concerns people’s ‘beliefs’ about their 
capabilities and thus the probabilities of success in carrying out their personal agenda. In this sense, 
agency becomes informed and possible purposive action. In this way, defining agency as purposive 
human action, critical institutionalism puts the agents back into the calculus behind social action.  
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 The process of significant change in Britain’s resource structure and culture had 
commenced centuries before the Glorious Revolution. Britain was going through a veritable 
revolution in agriculture from the early years of the 17th century: “…[h]arvests were 
good...[b]y the end of the century England was feeding herself comfortably and had even 
begun to export grain’ (O’Gorman, 1997, p.20–21). These productivity gains were the direct 
result of the efforts of smallholders, also known as “yeoman farmers” (Marglin, 2008). 
Enclosures, however, took on renewed expansion in the 17th and 18th centuries, whereby 
landlords started dispossessing smallholders in large numbers—owner of four-fifths of the 
land could impose enclosure on a whole village. According to Stephan Marglin (2008), the 
main reason behind enclosures were the desire of the landlords to increase their surpluses— 
previously, traditional mores in Britain had dictated a sharing of the commons between the 
landlord, free peasants and the serfs. Enclosures constituted a major social upheaval by 
pushing hundreds of thousands of indigent people towards the cities (Polanyi, 1944; 
Podobnik, 2006). However, where the forced exodus of people towards the major British 
cities constituted an upheaval, it was pivotal in turning British cities into major industrial 
centers (Coward, 1994). 
 In terms of culture, the role of technology increased in exponential terms in the years 
prior to the Glorious Revolution—technology here works in tandem with resource structure 
and agency and not independently as argued by the technological school. One example of the 
exponential increase in technology can be gleaned by the amount of deadweight tonnage 
(DWT) that was being carried by British merchant marine fleet. Coward (1994) shows that 
by 1688, Britain had the largest merchant marine fleet in the world, with a carrying capacity 
of 3.4 million tons in 1686, up from 2 million tons in 1660. Coward also shows through 
  44
anecdotal evidence that most of the biggest coalfields in Britain started being utilized in the 
beginning of the 17th century. Rising coal usage was directly linked with the expansion of 
smelting of lead, copper and tin. This initial expansion of the metal smelting fueled by coal 
laid the eventual foundation of the development of the metal industry in Britain.  
 By the time of the Glorious Revolution, the Whigs were on the political ascent. In the 
critical-institutionalist analysis of the Glorious Revolution, therefore, Whigs are the agents 
who carried out the institutional changes that came to be associated with the Glorious 
Revolution. The specific agenda of the Whigs can be characterized by their stance on three 
main issues of monarchy, religion and economy. Whigs developed their views on monarchy 
in opposition to the traditional conception about monarchy in Britain. Whigs, for instance, 
rejected the argument for monarchy’s divine right and hereditary succession. Whigs argued 
for a limited and constitutional monarchy that could not extract excessive surpluses from the 
economy at will. The Whig position on religion can be summarized as selective tolerance. 
Whigs were willing to show more toleration for those groups that had formally separated 
from the Church of England.  
  The Whigs were the very physical embodiment of Classical Liberalism. Whigs 
believed in maximal personal, political and social liberty. As an extension, leading Whigs 
were in favor of laissez-faire and free trade. Increasingly, Whigs came to be associated with 
the emerging industrial interests (metals, commerce etc.) and wealthy merchants 
(international trade) as where the former were leery of absolute monarchial powers, the latter 
preferred laissez-faire with minimal taxation. Thus, by the time of the Glorious Revolution, 
mass migration of indigent masses from country to town was in full swing due mainly to 
enclosures. Such mass migrations, where they were creating a massive pool of employable 
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labor, were also increasing the bargaining power of the elites—first landlords, then the 
Whigs. Moreover, technological changes in the shape of massive extraction of coal had also 
gotten underway. In other words, it can be argued that the ground had finally been prepared 
for the momentous economic and social changes that came to be known as the Industrial 
Revolution. 
 
FOSSIL-CAPITAL THEORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
Mainstream explanations argue that the Industrial Revolution is a story of exponential energy 
consumption made possible through technological innovations like the steam engine. 
However, the abundance and low cost of water-based technology at the time of the energy 
switch to fossil fuels presents a serious challenge to mainstream explanations. The real 
reasons for the switch from water to a fossil fuel-based energy system are to be found in the 
British industrial class’s desire to increase their bargaining power over the working classes, 
who were becoming increasingly restive due to union activism, especially since the early 
1800s. Though the British state had sided with landlords around the time of the Glorious 
Revolution in expanding the scope of enclosures (Marglin, 2008), it now felt forced, 
repeatedly through legislation, to provide some modicum of safety for the rights of the 
working classes, lest the working classes rise in open rebellion against the existing social and 
economic order.  
 Repeated legislation to safeguard the rights of the working classes was interpreted as 
a frontal attack by the British industrialists. In the minds of British industrialists, the 
pendulum seemed to be swinging too far in the direction of the working classes. Thus, to 
preserve their lion share of the surplus, the British industrialists started moving to the 
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industrial towns, where the displaced victims of enclosures from the country provided ample 
fodder for the industrialists to lend unemployment a functional quality. This step, in large 
part, was made possible by incorporating fossil fuels like coal in economic production since 
unlike water-based energy that required industrial production to be spread out, coal could 
essentially be dug up from a pit and transported to industrial towns. In a sense, British 
industry started moving from what Henri Lefebvre labelled “absolute space” to its “abstract” 
dimension (1974/1991). Absolute space was made up of sites that were selected because of 
their specific qualities—speed of water flow, for instance. Abstract space implies actual or 
potential production at a single point. The “abstractness” of fossil fuels like coal—or their 
ability to be concentrated at a single point—made the re-location of British industry possible, 
thus tethering economic production to the fossil fuel energy sources.  
 Additionally, the British government’s repeated legislation also assisted the process 
of tethering between economic growth and fossil fuel energy sources by changing the very 
nature of time as it had existed in the water-based energy system (Malm, 2013).20 In pre-
capitalist modes of production, time existed in its “concrete” form, that is as a dependent 
variable, largely a function of an occasion or natural rhythm: “Above all, concrete time is 
embedded in natural cycles (Malm, 2013, p. 55; italics in original). Pre-capitalist fishers and 
farmers were beholden to natural cycles like the ebb and flow of the tides or the daily cycles 
of night and day—fishing or farming could not be carried on in low tide or in the dark—in 
short, work fluctuated with the weather. “With the rise of capitalist property relations, there 
emerged...time as independent variable, a mathematical vessel, an incorporeal repository of 
                                                 
 20 “For Keynes…time is of crucial importance in understanding the workings of a monetary 
(capitalist) production economy…and is inextricably linked to fundamental uncertainty and to money 
itself. Economic processes occur in real time, where actions taken today that cannot be undone have 
unknowable consequences for the future” (Henry, 2012; italics in original). 
  47
events which heeds no seasons, weather or other concrete appearances in nature” (Malm, 
2013, p. 55). Water wheels could only be used as an energy source in the concrete time era 
since water flow exhibited tremendous fluctuation in the shape of ebb and flow and flooding 
and dry spells. Repeated legislation to regulate the working conditions—like capping the 
working day to ten hours—took away the power away from the British industrial class of 
keeping workers continuously engaged in work. This declining bargaining power viz. the 
working classes thus indicated to the British industrialists that to preserve their share of the 
surplus production processes had to move to the era of abstract time—a time devoid of 
seasonality and natural cycles. And, abstract time could only hold sway during economic 
production with the help of fossil fuel energy sources since they were not beholden to the 
vicissitudes of nature. In other words, political steps taken by the British government 
challenged the existing distribution of surplus between capital and labor. As a result, the 
industrial classes in order to preserve their lion share of the surplus as well as their 
bargaining power over the working classes, chose to tether economic production to fossil fuel 
energy sources by changing the spatio-temporality of economic production to abstract space 
and abstract time.21 
 To develop a model of this tethering, we may want to start with a monetary 
production or a capitalist economy. As is well known, in a monetary production economy the 
objective of all production is to enable the capitalists to make more money—this is also 
called surplus-value or profit. In other words, production in a capitalist economy is only done 
for securing profit. If we denote the amount of money available to capitalists at the beginning 
                                                 
 21 In a sense, abstract time is like pre-agriculture “historical time,” while concrete time can be 
thought of as “production time” since it exists prior to commodities arriving for exchange in a 
monetary production or capitalist economy. See Henry & Wray (1998).  
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with M and the produced output in the shape of commodities—since they are sold—with C 
then we can denote one complete cycle as M-C-M’, where M’>M—M’ is money at the end 
of the exchange process.  However, to turn M into M’, labor and means of production are 
first mixed with C to transform C into C’—so the process can be characterized as M-C-C’-
M’. Marx noted that no commodity production was possible without expropriating the 
“material substratum of exchange value” from nature (Malm, 2013, p.50). The material 
substratum is does not enter the product itself—cotton in a thread, say—rather, it is used up 
in the production process. Marx’s terminology for such raw materials that are used up in the 
process of production is “ancillary materials” or “accessories.” Moreover, commodities are 
transformed in the production process by mixing labor, L and means of production, MP in a 
way that the production and exchange process can be denoted by M-C(L+MP)-C’-M’. 
However, as mentioned above, during the Industrial Revolution, the British industrial class 
relocated industrial production to the industrial towns in order to preserve their bargaining 
power as well as their lion share of the surplus. This re-location necessitated the use of fossil 
fuels since these exhibited the necessary spatio-temporality required by the industrial classes. 
What this meant is that industrial production was now dependent on fossil fuels like coal—
since it worked the steam engine—since it acted as the material substratum of exchange-
value. In other words, economic production became tethered to fossil fuels. Using FF to 
represent fossil fuels, we are thus able to derive a general representation for Fossil-Capital: 
M-C(L+MP(FF))-C’-M’ (Malm, 2013). 
CONCLUSION 
A major puzzle in economic history centers on why did the Industrial Revolution start in 
Western Europe? Mainstream explanations that tackle this puzzle generally assign a pride of 
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place to institutional—secure property rights—and technological innovations—steam engine. 
Using interdisciplinary sources, this chapter shows that mainstream explanations are based 
on narrow empirics. To be sure, secure property rights already existed in Britain, at least two 
hundred years before the Glorious Revolution. At the same time, this chapter argued that 
mainstream explanations generally emanating out of mainstream economics show 
philosophical ignorance in failing to provide a moral appraisal with respect to whether 
outcomes are fair, just or equitable. More importantly, this chapter showed that during the 
industrial revolution switching from water to fossil fuel-based energy sources was not based 
on economic considerations since water was neither scare nor more expensive than coal. 
Placing the Glorious Revolution on the same historical continuum as the Industrial 
Revolution through their common link with enclosures, this chapter argued that the real 
reasons behind switching to fossil fuels were political-economic. The energy switch was 
driven by the landlord/industrial class’s desire to maintain its bargaining power and the lion 
share of the surplus. Finally, the chapter advanced two models that illustrated the political-
economic nature of both institutional and technological change in Britain: 1) Critical-
Institutionalism 2) Fossil-Capital. Critical-Institutionalism explained the events of the 
Glorious Revolution through the interplay of the distribution of resources, culture and 
agency. Fossil-Capital demonstrated how fossil fuels became an integral part of production in 
monetary production economies largely due to political-economic considerations. 
 This chapter connects with the rest of this dissertation by exploring the historical 
antecedents of the relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy 
consumption. Subsequent chapters expose the theoretical and the empirical nature of the 
relationship, especially in the case of net energy-importing emerging economies. 
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The most important take-home lesson of this chapter is that the “invisible hand” or unfettered 
markets did not bring about a switch in energy systems during the Industrial Revolution; 
rather, energy system switch was the deliberate action of a coalition—the visible hands of a 
few, if you will. In other words, lower cost of coal—coal-based energy remained more 
expensive than water-based energy—did not automatically bring about the switch in energy 
systems during the Industrial Revolution. An important implication of these findings is that 
they open up a possibility for emerging economies’ policymakers, who are concerned about 
the link between climate change and fossil fuels, to contemplate a policy-led untethering 
between economic growth and fossil fuels—as opposed to waiting for the invisible hand to 
spring into action. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENERGY 
CONSUMPTION IN NET ENERGY-IMPORTING EMERGING ECONOMIES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature in economics argues that the rates of 
economic growth and energy consumption are diverging with energy consumption slowing 
down in comparison to the rate of economic growth. In terms of a graph, a veritable gap is 
opening up between economic growth and energy consumption. Though the two variables 
have moved in lockstep throughout history, economic growth and energy consumption are 
now said to have “decoupled.” Specifically, the EKC literature posits that the relationship 
between income and environmental pollution proxies economic growth and energy 
consumption and follows an inverted U-shape, meaning that as nations become richer they 
reach an inflection point after which the absolute quantity of pollution, or energy 
consumption, becomes a decreasing function of income.  
The relationship between economic growth and energy consumption has not been 
examined in net energy-importing emerging economies. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
examine the relationship between economic growth and energy consumption in net energy-
importing emerging economies. This chapter serves as a theoretical foundation for examining 
the said relationship. This chapter is divided into six sections. Section one introduces the 
purpose of the research. Section two provides a brief background of the EKC literature. 
Section three details some of the shortcomings of the EKC-hypothesis, especially in the 
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context of emerging economies. Section four highlights the underlying linkages in the 
relationship between economic growth and energy consumption in emerging economies. 
Section five underscores the importance of developing a better purchase of the relationship 
between economic growth and energy consumption in net oil-importing emerging 
economies—net oil-importing emerging economies suffer from some unique macroeconomic 
challenges. The last section wraps up the discussion. 
There is an urgent need to understand this relationship in net energy-importing 
emerging economies for two main reasons: First, the EKC-hypothesis has led some scholars 
in emerging economies to argue against any pollution/climate change mitigation strategies. 
“In developing countries, some policymakers have interpreted such results as conveying a 
message about priorities: Grow first, then clean up” (Dasgupta, Laplante, Wang & Wheeler, 
2002, p.147). However, if economic growth drives energy consumption in net energy-
importing emerging economies then appropriate climate change mitigation policies would be 
required. The preceding policy view that economic growth should take precedence over 
pollution/climate change mitigation strategies, has been challenged. For starters, it is not 
entirely clear as to what impact would a focus on pollution/climate change mitigation will 
have on economic growth, especially in emerging economies.1 Will such a focus bring about 
economic hardship? At least some of the computer simulations of the economic impact of 
negative growth do not appear harrowing.2 Such results have prompted some researchers to 
                                                 
1 This question is taken up in detail in the next chapter through an econometric analysis of the 
link between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption in emerging economies. 
2 Using LowGrow, a quantitative model of the Canadian economy, Victor simulates a 
degrowth scenario for the Canadian economy. The simulated degrowth scenario results in substantial 
reductions in unemployment, human poverty index and debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio. 
At the same time, this degrowth simulation leads to 80% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions—primarily brought about by reducing GDP and through substantially increasing carbon 
tax.  
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point out that though economic growth remains the main objective for most governments, the 
question that needs to be pondered upon is “…what if a reduction in economic growth, or its 
elimination, even degrowth, is necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change…?” (Victor, 
2012, p. 207).3  
Second, the significant negative macroeconomic impact of sudden and severe 
increases in the energy import bill on net energy-importing emerging economies has not been 
properly highlighted. Again, if economic growth drives energy consumption, then net 
energy-importing emerging economies need to be very careful in monitoring the magnitude 
of energy import bills since such import bills can make these countries lose control over their 
monetary policy or exchange rate or bring about full-scale financial instability.  
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Traditional understanding of economic growth’s impact on the environment noted that 
economic growth processes were in some way damaging to the environment. The first 
evidence of what came to be known as the “greenhouse effect” was presented by John 
Tyndall in 1859—six months before Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (Hulme, 
2009). However, it was also believed that economic growth’s environmental impact could be 
tempered through the use of technological innovation that would assist in protecting the 
environment (Ehrlich & Holdren, 1971). However, as the idea of sustainable development—
development was not necessarily damaging to the environment—took hold in the 1980s, 
Grossman and Krueger (1991) introduced the concept of the EKC. In analyzing the 
                                                 
3 Degrowth, an anti-economic growth movement, was inspired by ecological economics and 
was launched in the early 2000s. Degrowth focused on voluntary societal shrinking of production and 
consumption to lead to social and ecological sustainability. For a summary, see: Demaria, F., 
Schneider, F., Sekulova, F., & Martinez-Alier, J. (2013).  
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environmental impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Grossman 
and Krueger argued that instead of damaging the environment, increased economic growth 
would improve environmental quality. The World Bank’s 1992 World Development Report 
(WDR) popularized the EKC arguing that the notion that economic growth was damaging to 
the environment was based on “static assumptions” about technological innovation, tastes 
and the level of environmental investments.  
 
THE PAUCITY OF EKC-HYPOTHESIS 
 
Lack of empirical support 
Evidence to support the assertions of EKC-hypothesis is not always forthcoming. For 
instance, Shafik (1994), whose research was relied upon by the World Bank to make the case 
about static assumptions, had actually found that not all environmental impacts decline with 
increasing income; Shafik found that urban waste and carbon emissions rose monotonically 
with income per capita. Narayan & Narayan (2010) tested for the existence of EKC by 
checking for income elasticity differentials between short and the long-term. They found an 
EKC-like phenomenon exists for only 35% of the sample. Moreover, in 41 studies reviewed 
by a scholar (Hervieux & Mahieu, 2014), a wide disparity was found between the inflection 
points—income where pollution levels in the economy start to decline—ranging from $5,000 
per capita to $33,000 per capita (USD 2000). A significant number (3/4) of the studies 
reviewed did not find conclusive evidence to support the EKC hypothesis. More recently, 
Mir and Storm (2016) investigated the EKC hypothesis by exploring the existence of a 
Carbon-Kuznets-curve using panel data from 39 countries for both production and 
consumption-based CO2 emissions. The authors show that despite reduction in overall CO2 
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emissions in the developed world, consumption-based CO2 emissions are increasing 
monotonically with economic growth. Rather than curbing their CO2 emissions through 
technological or structural changes in the economies, developed countries, the authors 
conclude, have simply shifted their production to the developing ones. 
 
Absence of underlying mechanisms 
The EKC hypothesis has also come under criticism for lacking specificity. For instance, 
Kaika and Zervas (2013a) point out that though most studies now use a cubic reduced-form 
model to investigate the relationship between income and pollution, the actual underlying 
mechanisms are not spelled out: how does a rising income lead to reduction in pollution? The 
authors provide a list that contains the some of the underlying mechanisms that have been 
pointed out by some scholars: 
a. Income Inequality: as economic growth picks up countries become less 
unequal. Consequently, political power is more evenly distributed given it is a 
function of income distribution. Thus, demand for environment-protection 
legislation rises since those who have just gained more political power stand 
to lose the most from environmental degradation (Torras & Boyce, 1998). 
b. International Trade and Pollution Havens: As economies grow they produce 
more pollution-intensive products; however, in such growing economies 
legislation makes it increasingly difficult to keep up such production 
practices. Instead, the factories that produce pollution-intensive products 
relocate to less-rich countries that have less-stringent pollution legislation. For 
this reason, even though richer countries may show an EKC relationship, 
  56
global pollution/emissions/energy consumption increases as poorer nations 
turn into pollution sinks. The preceding point is known as the “pollution 
haven hypothesis” (Dinda, 2004; Mir & Storm, 2016). 
c. Structural Change and Technical Progress: As economies grow, they undergo 
a structural change in the overall economic composition (composition effect) 
and thus shift towards producing information-based products and services. At 
the same time, technological innovation leads to fewer inputs being used as 
well as to the introduction of cleaner technologies (technique effect). Both the 
composition and the technique effect lead to EKC-type relationships. 
d. Institutional Framework and Governance: A government’s willingness to 
impose environmental regulation is cited as a major factor impacting 
environmental degradation. According to this view, economic growth is an 
essential condition in bringing about a reduction in pollution; however, it is 
not the only one. Whether environmental quality will improve depends, 
according to this mechanism, on a country’s political, social and economic 
institutions. “Some studies already estimate an EKC-pattern in some 
developed countries which are characterized by better governance, stronger 
political institutions, better socioeconomic conditions and greater investment 
in education (Dutt, 2009)” (Kaika & Zervas, 2013a, p. 1397). 
e. Consumer Preferences: Some EKC studies have focused on how consumers 
change their preferences for environmental protection as their income 
increases. In other words, some studies have analyzed how income elasticity 
of demand for environmental quality changes over time. Most studies have 
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found income elasticity of demand for environmental quality to be more than 
unity, meaning that demand for environmental quality is a “luxury” good. It 
remains, however, difficult to accurately calculate the income elasticity of 
demand for environmental quality.4 Given  that calculating income elasticity 
of demand for environmental quality is difficult, some studies try to go around 
this challenge by conducting surveys of Willingness to Pay (WTP). However, 
WTP studies have found income elasticity of demand for environmental 
quality to be less than unity. Moreover, where scholars have found evidence 
from Sweden to indicate that environmental quality is a luxury good (Kander 
& Lindmark, 2004), Italian household consumption expenditures indicate that 
it is close to one (Martini & Tiezzi, 2014). Regardless, “…income-pollution 
issue is a macro-economic subject and any microeconomic foundations of this 
relationship, although helpful and meaningful, are hard to be analyzed in a 
sufficient way (McConnell, 1997)” (Kaika & Zervas, 2013a, p.1397). 
 
EKC-hypothesis and emerging economies 
A significant issue with the EKC-hypothesis is its lack of relevance for emerging economies. 
For instance, even studies—a few studies from the 1990s indicated that pollutants like sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) peaked at what was then the world mean per capita income—that find for a 
EKC-like relationship, lack relevance for emerging economies owing to the use of world 
mean per capita income. Stern (2017) points out that world per capita income is highly 
                                                 
4 Income elasticity of demand for environmental quality (η) is equal to η= (∆E)%/(∆/Y)%; E 
is the quantity of environmental good demanded and Y is income. The main difficulty with 
calculating income elasticity of environmental quality is how to measure the quantity of 
environmental good demanded (Kaika & Zervas, 2013a). 
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skewed with a much larger number of people below the mean, especially in the emerging 
economies. For this reason, when it comes to EKC’s relevance in the case of emerging 
economies, world median per capita income is the more appropriate measure.  
Some scholars have taken issue with the teleological nature of the EKC-hypothesis 
that paints an inevitable scenario of declining pollution levels. Specifically, world-systems5 
scholars have argued that the relationship between economic growth and environmental 
protection (EKC) should not be seen as an inevitable stage of development, especially since 
the path of economic development is now closed to many developing countries due to their 
past history of colonization and exploitation of natural resources etc. These scholars question 
the efficacy of the EKC literature since, according to the scholars, most of the world’s 
population will never attain the income per capita at which pollution is said to start declining 
(Roberts & Grimes, 1987). 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN 
EMERGING ECONOMIES 
 
The relationship between economic growth and energy consumption is affected by a range of 
economic, structural and technological factors. Experts (India Energy Outlook, 2015; 
IEO2015, hereafter) believe that the impact of some factors leads to energy consumption 
rising faster than economic growth. For instance, increasing incomes lead to energy 
consumption rising faster than economic growth as people buy more household appliances 
                                                 
5 World-systems analysis is a heterodox (Marxian) approach for understanding the global 
patterns of economic and political power as well as domination. It is different from orthodox 
Marxism in two main ways: First, it backdates the origins of capitalist system to the 16th century. 
Second, world-systems argues that capitalism gives rise to various labor relations as opposed to the 
“…Marxian account of the emergence of capitalism as an economic system” (Babones, 2015, p.4). 
For an overview, see Babones (2015). 
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like refrigerators, air-conditioners etc. Energy consumption also grows more rapidly than 
economic growth when growth occurs in energy-intensive industries like steel and cement 
making and the same rates of rapid energy consumption can be witnessed as vehicle-
ownership rates rise in emerging economies. Another factor that leads to the faster increase 
in energy consumption is electrification—when people gain access to electricity for the first 
time. However, energy consumption does not rise as fast as economic growth when services 
are in the process of replacing manufacturing as the biggest part of GDP. Moreover, the rates 
of energy consumption can be further slowed by gains in energy efficiency. Experts believe 
that the relationship between economic growth and energy consumption is significantly 
different between developed and emerging economies (Wolfram, Shelef & Gertler, 2012). In 
emerging economies, factors that bring about a rapid increase in energy consumption like 
rising incomes, electrification, energy-intensive manufacturing and increasing vehicle-
ownership, dominate (IEO2015).6  
 According to a recent report (BP Energy Outlook, 2016 edition; BP2016 hereafter), 
world economy will double in the next twenty years through 2035, while energy 
consumption will increase by 34%. At the same time, the report notes, “virtually all of the 
additional energy is consumed in fast-growing emerging economies; energy demand within 
the OECD will barely grow” (BP2016, p.13). One of the main reasons behind this forecast 
increase in energy consumption is that the process of economic growth leads to more energy 
consumption through reduction in poverty in emerging economies. As a result, the newly-
emerging middle class (formerly-poor citizens) purchase household appliances—like air 
                                                 
6 For instance, in India, final energy consumption shares of the three sectors of industrial 
production, transport and buildings (residential and commercial use) stood at 90% in 2013 
(IEO2015).  
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conditioners—in greater numbers (Wolfram, Shelef & Gertler, 2012). In International 
Energy Outlook 2016 (IEO2016, hereafter), the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) notes that only 2% of Indian households currently have an air conditioner —as 
opposed to 87% of U.S. household as noted by EIA’s Residential Energy Consumption 
Survey (RECS). EIA also notes that an air conditioner is one of most prevalent purchase for 
the rising Indian middle class—sales are increasing at 20% per year and about 3.3 million air 
conditioners were sold in India7 in the fiscal year 2013-14.8 
 Apart from household appliances like air conditioners and refrigerators, economic 
growth also increases the incidence of vehicle ownership in emerging economies. The 
increase in vehicle ownership leads to a faster rise in energy consumption in emerging 
economies (Dargay, Gately & Sommer, 2007). Scholars have shown vehicle ownership to be 
“…S-shaped, Gompertz function of per capita income,” meaning that vehicle ownership rates 
really pick up when the mean income per capita is between $3000-$10,000 (Dargay, Gately 
& Sommer, 2007, p. 27). In future, these scholars point out, vehicle ownership will rise from 
800 million units in 2002 to over 2 billion units in 2030; emerging economies’ share of total 
vehicle ownership will rise from 24% in 2002 to 56% in 2030. Importantly, “[b]y 2030, 
vehicle ownership in virtually all OECD countries will have reached saturation, but in most 
                                                 
7 Massive energy consumption due to air conditioning is amplified by the fact that most low-
income countries are also geographically located in the global South—Sub-Saharan Africa, for 
instance—meaning that they have, on average, higher median temperatures than the global North, 
thus creating a demand for wider use of air conditioning. According to forecasts that factor in median 
temperature and population size, 22 out of the top 25 energy consumers will be below the World 
Bank threshold for developed countries. The forecast also notes that if India, alone, adopted U.S. 
cooling standards, it would end up using 14 times more energy than the U.S. primarily because of 
higher median temperatures (Sivak, 2013). In other words, higher energy consumption in emerging 
economies like India—driven, in part, by the enhanced purchasing capacity—is amplified by higher 
median temperatures. 
8 Source: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=23512 
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of Asia it will only be at 15% to 45% of ownership saturation levels” (Dargay, Gately & 
Sommer, 2007, p.28).  
 Industrial production in the emerging economies also contributes significantly 
towards increasing the rate and amount of energy consumption (Galli, 1998). IEO2016 points 
out that Asian emerging economies (even when China and India are excluded) are some of 
the fastest growing industrial-energy consuming nations worldwide. “In general, the nations 
of other non-OECD Asia have among the highest projected growth in industrial sector gross 
output and associated delivered energy consumption” (IEO2016, chapter 7). One reason why 
industrial production uses such a significant portion of energy in emerging economies has to 
do with the lack of infrastructure in emerging economies. As emerging economies start 
developing economically, they essentially start building new infrastructure like roads, 
bridges, airports etc. (Galli, 1998). The main input into infrastructure projects is steel and 
cement (Smil, 1994). Steel and cement manufacturing is extremely energy-intensive and 
roughly “…80 percent of cement is made and used by emerging economies” (Rosenthal, 
2007). 
 Where increasing ownership of household appliances, vehicles and industrial 
production of energy-intensive materials like steel and cement significantly increase energy 
consumption in emerging economies, electrification, that is, access to electricity, also drives 
energy consumption. People who gain access to electric power buy household appliances like 
air conditioners and refrigerators. These appliances need electric power, which is generated 
through additional energy consumption. According to a joint report, Sustainable Energy for 
All (SE4All, 2015), by the World Bank and the International Energy Agency (IEA), globally 
1.1 billion people still do not have access to electricity. Out of these 1.1 billion people, 88% 
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reside in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia—of these about 263 million people reside in 
India alone; with Bangladesh, Kenya, Philippines and Sudan also among the top twenty 
countries with most people without electricity. In sum, as access to electricity increases in 
emerging economies, more people buy energy-consuming household appliances. This need 
for additional electricity brings about significant increases in energy consumption in 
emerging economies.  
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NET 
ENERGY-IMPORTING EMERGING ECONOMIES 
 
Some studies have looked at the relationship between economic growth and energy 
consumption in the context of “developing countries” (Lee, 2005). Surprisingly, however, 
these studies make no distinction between net energy importers and exporters, including both 
types of economies in the sample. Lee (2005), for instance, develops a panel dataset 
comprising 18 developing countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and Venezuela. 
However, data obtained for these four countries from the World bank indicates that all four 
nations have been net energy exporters for every year from 1976 through 2012. In order to 
investigate the relationship between economic growth and energy consumption, it is 
important to make a distinction between net energy importers and exporters because net 
energy exporters do not suffer from the same economic restrictions with respect to domestic 
energy consumption.  
This section provides two important reasons why we must pay attention to the 
relationship between energy consumption and economic growth in net energy-importing 
emerging economies. The first reason has to do with macroeconomics and financial stability. 
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Due to large energy import bills emerging economies may easily lose control over their 
monetary policy and suffer from financial instability (Akyuz & Boratav, 2003). The second 
reason has to do with policy. Through 2040, emerging economies will grow at almost 4.2% 
per year, whereas developed economies will only mange 2% per year (IEO2016). Given that 
economic growth is one of the main drivers of energy consumption, a better understanding of 
the relationship will assist policymakers with better management of energy demand and 
consumption. 
 
Energy imports and balance-of-payments crises 
The failure to take stock of sudden and severe increases in the magnitude of energy import 
bills in net energy importing emerging economies gives rise to several macroeconomic 
challenges. For starters, higher energy import bills can lead to severe balance-of-payments 
crises. Usually, the chief reason behind a balance-of-payments crisis is a country’s 
unsurmountable trade deficit. Though trade deficits put downward pressure on currencies, a 
managed devaluation in the exchange rate can bring about an improvement in the trade 
deficit. However, rather than devaluing their currencies to bring about an improvement in the 
trade deficit—exports become cheaper and thus are increasingly bought by trading 
partners—, emerging economies strive to maintain a stable exchange rate through buoying 
their currencies with the help of foreign exchange reserves. The reason behind this policy is 
the desire to preserve the purchasing power of the citizens, that is the emerging economies 
want to “…prevent ‘consumption crises’ in which sharply depreciated currency prevents 
people from purchasing basic necessities” (Thomas, 2000, p. 1253). If foreign exchange 
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reserves are not enough to buttress a depreciating currency, exchange rates can end up going 
into a downward spiral. 
 
Indian balance-of-payments crisis 1990/91 
The 1990/91 balance-of-payments crisis in India is a text-book example of how large energy 
import bills can lead to severe macroeconomic challenges for energy importing nations. In 
1990/91, the first Gulf War led to a sudden and severe increase in the price of oil. In 1990/91 
alone, the value of petroleum imports for India increased by $2 billion to $5.7 billion “…as a 
result of …spike in world prices associated with the Middle East crisis…” (Cerra & Saxena, 
2002, p.403). The rising trade deficit put immense downward pressure on the Indian Rupee. 
Initially, the Indian government tried to arrest the decline in the exchange rate through 
expending reserves. However, severe downward pressures continued and eventually the 
Indian government had to significantly devalue the Indian Rupee.  
 
Energy imports and financial instability 
Besides trying to avoid a consumption crisis, there are additional reasons emerging 
economies find it increasingly difficult to address balance-of-payments crises through 
currency devaluation. The reason that prevents emerging economies from devaluing their 
currencies when faced with balance-of-payments crises has to do with the nature of 
international investors’ expectations and mobile capital flows in the global financial system. 
Given perfect capital mobility, significant pressure is generated on emerging economies to 
maintain a stable exchange rate because a stable exchange rate is seen internationally as a 
sign of economic and political stability within emerging economies (Akyuz & Boratav, 
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2003). Thus, due to stable exchange rate expectations, letting the exchange rate slide in order 
to correct the balance-of-payments crisis is not a viable policy option because an exchange 
rate depreciation results in conflicting dynamics generated by the countervailing capital 
outflows as international capital moves to other emerging economies. What this means is that 
for an emerging economy seeking international capital inflows, though there is a flexible 
exchange rate regime, the exchange rate operates as being essentially fixed. At the same 
time, the need to attract international capital inflows, emerging economies have no option but 
to maintain a tight monetary policy so that they can sustain large international interest rate 
differentials that attract the capital inflows, in the first place. In a sense, perfect capital 
mobility in the global financial system and the need to have a stable—fixed, de facto— 
exchange rate also renders the monetary policy in an emerging economy ineffective 
(Mundell, 1963). Monetary policy ineffectiveness due to fixed exchange rate and perfectly 
mobile capital was pointed out by the Mundell-Fleming model, who extended the Keynesian 
model of an open economy to include capital flows (Snowdon & Vane, 2006). This inability 
to control monetary policy is also known as the “policy trilemma” in international 
macroeconomics (Obstfeld, 1997).  
In the case of some emerging economies, international capital inflows instead of 
assisting with balance-of-payments crises, end up leading to significant macroeconomic 
challenges that include potential financial sector and exchange rate problems, thereby 
eliminating “...any increase in policy space...” (Kregel, 2008/2014, p.172) which may have 
come about as a result of increased capital inflows. According to Kregel (2008/2014), John 
Maynard Keynes pointed out the problems inherent in global financial liberalization in 
Chapter 36 of his Treatise on Money (1930). At least in the case of Latin America, argues 
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Kregel (2004/2014), international financial liberalization, especially since the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods System in 1973, has led to emerging economies taking on “Ponzi” profiles.9 
 
Thai financial crisis  
The case of Thailand’s balance-of-payments crisis is instructive. In the 1990s, large capital 
inflows led to a booming investment sector, which, in turn, led to an increase in the demand 
for imported capital goods thus generating precipitous trade deficits in that decade. Fearful of 
losing international capital flows, Thai government did not devalue the Thai Baht to avoid 
any loss of investor confidence. In 1997, as various reports about the overly-leveraged Thai 
Banking system came to fore, a massive capital outflow ensued. Still fearful of losing 
investor confidence, Thai government refused to devalue the Baht and eventually ran out of 
reserves. At this point the exchange rate for the Baht went into a downward spiral, eventually 
losing more than half its value (Thomas, 2000, p.1252-53). 
 
CONCLUSION 
This investigation is motivated by the EKC-hypothesis, which argues that as nations get 
richer, pollution intensity—a proxy for fossil fuel-based energy consumption—starts to 
decline after reaching an inflection point. Specifically, the hypothesis posits an inverted U-
shaped relationship between economic growth per capita and pollution intensity. Some 
policymakers in emerging economies have interpreted the findings of the EKC literature to 
                                                 
9 “The most famous of the profiles Minsky proposed is “Ponzi finance”, which arises when 
some unexpected and unforeseen internal or external event or occurrence is inflicted unto a firm with 
speculative financing profile. As a result, it finds itself in a position where it cannot meet its current 
cash commitments there is little expectation of it being able to do so for a sufficient number of future 
periods that the net present value of the investment being financed by the lender becomes negative.” 
(Kregel, 2004/2014, p.19–20). 
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make a case for only focusing on economic growth. These policymakers also argue against 
taking climate change policy measures as these may entail curtailing fossil fuel-based energy 
consumption.  
This chapter adds value toward understanding the relationship between economic 
growth and energy consumption and serves as a launch pad for the econometric analysis of the 
relationship (subsequent chapter). This chapter introduces the dissertation’s purpose and 
details some of the shortcomings of the EKC literature, especially with respect to emerging 
economies. Next, the chapter highlights some of the different mechanisms that link economic 
growth to energy consumption, especially in the context of emerging economies—also, given 
energy consumption trends in emerging economies, it is highly unlikely that the relationship 
between economic growth and energy consumption is curvilinear. The chapter then argues that 
it is important to understand the relationship between economic growth and energy 
consumption in the case of net energy-importing emerging economies because their need to 
import energy creates unique challenges for these economies. The unending need for trade 
finance for importing energy creates unrelenting stress on the external account in emerging 
economies. This stress, in turn, leads to multiple macroeconomic problems for net energy-
importing emerging economies that include loss of control over monetary policy or exchange 
rate or full-scale financial instability. The exposition of macroeconomic problems will guide 
policymakers towards better macroeconomic policies in emerging economies. This chapter 
outlined different ways in which a rising energy import bill can quickly become unsustainable 
for net energy-importing emerging economies—the 1990/91 Indian balance-of-payments crisis 
is a case in point. There is still a need to carefully monitor energy imports in emerging 
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economies. According to the EIA, India is still heavily dependent on Middle-Eastern oil.10 In 
2015, India was the fourth-largest consumer of oil after United States, China and Japan.11 In 
light of this research, Indian policymakers would be best advised to carefully monitor the 
quantum of energy imports, especially as Indian economy is poised for rapid growth of 7.5% 
in 2016.12    
 
                                                 
10 Source: http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=IND 
11 India has just surpassed Japan to become the third largest consumer of oil in the World. 
Source: http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-
energy/oil/oil-and-product-consumption.html 
12 Source: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2016/car030216a.htm 
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CHAPTER 4 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION GROWTH IN NET ENERGY-IMPORTING 
EMERGING ECONOMIES 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Econometric studies that seek to identify a causal connection between economic growth and 
energy consumption rely on statistical tests of Granger causality. Based on different 
econometric methodologies, the literature on the subject can be said to be in its fourth 
generation (Constantini & Martini, 2010). Interest in the subject can be traced back to the 
pioneering work of Kraft and Kraft (1978), who examined energy use and its relationship 
with economic growth in the US. They found a Granger causal relationship going from 
economic growth to energy consumption. Several different studies were also carried out 
using data from the US (Akara & Long, 1980; Yu & Hwang, 1984). These first-generation 
studies assumed that the analyzed time series were stationary and thus used traditional Vector 
Autoregressive methodology (VAR) along with Granger causality testing (Granger, 1969).  
In subsequent studies—or second-generation models—it was realized that the 
available time series were not always stationary and for this reason cointegration analysis 
was employed. Second-generation studies thus tested pairs of variables for cointegrating 
relationship and used Error Correction models (ECM). Third-generation studies moved 
towards using multivariate estimators (Johansen, 1991), where various restrictions on 
cointegrating relationships could be tested. Among these, Johansen’s approach enables the 
testing of more than two variables in the cointegrating relationship (see, among others, Masih 
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& Masih, 1996; Stern, 2000, Asafu-Adjaye, 2000). Fourth-generation studies (Lee, 2005; 
Narayan & Smyth, 2008; Constantini & Martini, 2010; Ouedraogo, 2013) employ panel 
cointegration techniques developed by Pedroni (1999; 2004), while working with panel 
datasets from different countries.  
Some of the econometric studies have concluded that there is no relationship between 
economic growth and energy consumption—so-called neutrality hypothesis. Such 
econometric studies are another incarnation of the EKC-hypothesis since they point out that, 
given there is no relationship, economic growth can proceed without energy consumption. 
However, in the wider econometric literature that analyses the relationship, there is no 
consensus on the nature of the relationship. Categorizing econometric studies on the basis 
their conclusions, Ozturk (2010) forwards the following classification:  
a. Neutrality Hypothesis: These studies find no causality between economic 
growth and energy consumption. This is also referred to as the “neutrality 
hypothesis,” meaning that there the quantum of energy consumption is neutral 
with respect to economic growth and vice versa. There are no energy policy 
implications of this result since there is no evidence that conservative or 
expansive energy consumption policies have any impact on economic growth. 
b. Conservation Hypothesis: These studies find that causality runs from 
economic growth to energy consumption. This is also known as the 
“conservation hypothesis,” since this conclusion provides evidence that 
implementing energy conservation policies will have no adverse impact on 
economic growth.  
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c. Growth Hypothesis: These studies provide evidence that causality runs from 
energy consumption to economic growth. It is also referred to as the “growth 
hypothesis,” since this hypothesis provides evidence that restrictions on 
energy consumption have a negative impact on economic growth.  
d. Feedback Hypothesis: These studies provide evidence that causality runs both 
ways between economic growth and energy consumption with the implication 
that economic growth and energy consumption are jointly determined and 
impacted simultaneously. 
 
PANEL ECONOMETRICS AND EMERGING ECONOMIES 
The empirical analysis in this chapter employs panel methods in the context of emerging 
economies (read: developing countries), to avoid the shortfall associated with typically short 
time series for individual emerging countries.  Panel datasets increase the sample size, 
thereby increasing the degrees of freedom, reliability and accuracy of statistical tests. Panel 
data may also assist in reducing multicollinearity between regressors. Panel cointegration 
techniques significantly increase the number of available observations through pooling and 
thus increase the power of unit root and cointegration tests (Constantini & Martini, 2010). 
2.1. Unit root tests for panel data 
Developments in panel unit root tests include Levin et al. (2002; referred to as LLC), 
Im et al. (2003; referred to as IPS), Breitung (2000; referred to as BRT), Maddala and Wu 
(1999), Choi (2001) and Hadri (2000, a,b). A basic autoregressive model can be expressed as 
follows: 
 =    +  
 +                         (1) 
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where  i = 1,2...N represent countries observed over periods t=1, 2...T. Xit are exogenous 
variables, ρi are the autoregressive coefficients and εit is a stationary process. If ρi<1, yi does 
not contain a unit root—it is said to weakly trend-stationary. However, if ρi=1, then yi 
contains a unit root and is non-stationary. LLC, BRT and Hadri tests assume that εit are I.I.D. 
(independent and identically distributed (0, σe2); and that ρi = ρ for all I. 
One of the main benefits of using panel data-based tests is that they increase the 
statistical power of tests. However, panel data-based testing can also suffer from some 
shortcomings. For instance, the traditional augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) for unit root 
has a low power in rejecting the null of no stationarity, especially if the series spans a short 
time period. Moreover, assuming homogeneity for some panel unit root tests can be too 
restrictive, especially when the panel includes different countries. That is to say that 
“[i]mposing homogeneity when coefficient heterogeneity is present in cross-section data can 
result in misleading conclusions” (Barreira & Rodrigues, 2005, p.4).  
Specific panel unit root tests, like the IPS (2003), are available that work around the 
above-mentioned issues by allowing for heterogeneous coefficients. Besides IPS, some other 
tests also allow for heterogeneous coefficients, meaning that these tests operate under the 
assumption that different cross-sectional units (countries, in our case) are systematically 
different from each other in the dynamics, that is these tests allow for a heterogeneous 
coefficient of yit-1. Equation (2) shows how a separate ADF regression for each cross-section 
is specified in the IPS test. 
 =   +  ∑   Δ, +         (2) 
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Panel cointegration  
Panel cointegration techniques, developed by Pedroni (1999), have significantly improved 
the conventional ways of carrying out cointegration analysis. Pedroni (1999; 2000) has 
forwarded two types of residual-based tests for panel cointegration. In the first type, residuals 
are pooled along the “within-dimension” (panel tests). For the second type, residuals are 
pooled “between-dimension” (group tests).  
 
Granger causality in cointegrated panels 
Due to the mentioned problems associated with small samples, panel data tests have 
increasingly been used in order to test for causality between variables. For cointegrated 
variables, Pedroni’s heterogeneous panel cointegration tests are only able to indicate if there 
is a long run association between two variables. Causality can only be tested between 
cointegrated variables through using a Wald test after a VECM has been estimated. However, 
if panel cointegration tests indicate the absence of cointegration then we must test causality 
through developing a panel VAR model. 
 
ANALYSIS OF DATASET 
To obtain data for this investigation, several databases were reviewed, including the data 
maintained by Conference Board, International Energy Agency (IEA), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Penn World Tables, U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
U.S. Department of Energy, as well as the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI).  
 
  74
Systemic criteria for sample selection  
In order to develop a representative sample to investigate the relationship between economic 
growth and energy consumption in net energy-importing emerging economies, countries 
were selected according to criteria developed by World Economic Outlook (WEO), the 
flagship publication from the IMF. WEO divides countries into two different groups: i) 
Advanced economies ii) Emerging market and developing economies.1 All 152 countries in 
the category of “emerging market and developing economies” were selected as a starting 
point. 
 35 of the 152 countries were small island nations with very small populations. 
Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States’ criterion for Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS) was implemented to remove small island nations—those 
that had a population less than 1.5 million.2 Next, 53 countries that were missing data were 
removed.3 These countries included 13 that made up the ex-USSR, as data for these countries 
                                                 
 1 To bifurcate countries, WEO factors in three different indicators: i) per capita income; ii) 
export diversification; and iii) degree of integration into the global financial system. One outcome of 
using (ii) is that certain oil exporting-countries are not included in the list of advanced economies as 
70% of their exports are just oil. Regarding this bifurcation, the WEO points out “…This 
classification is not based on strict criteria, economic or otherwise, and it has evolved over time. The 
objective is to facilitate analysis by providing a reasonably meaningful method of organizing data. 
Reclassification only happens when something marked changes or the case for change in terms of the 
three criteria above becomes overwhelming…” Frequently Asked Questions. (2016, April 12). 
Retrieved June 9, 2016, from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/faq.htm#q4b  
 2 Different international organizations categorize “small” countries differently using various 
criteria. The most-commonly used criterion has been a population threshold of 1.5 million as 
proposed by the Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States. Source: 
United Nations. (2004). Is special treatment of small island developing States possible? New 
York/Geneva. Retrieved June 10, 2016 from http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ldc20041_en.pdf 
 3 One popular method of removing observations (cross-sectional units) that contain missing 
data is known as “listwise deletion” (Selvin, 2010). However, removing entire observations can lead 
to reduction of statistical power due to the reduction in sample size. If the missing data is missing at 
random, certain “replacement” techniques can be used to insert missing data points interpolation. 
However, it is very difficult to estimate the distribution of missing data, meaning that it is entirely 
possible that the missing data is not missing at random (NMAR). When data is NMAR, interpolation 
techniques cannot be used. Though some Model-Based Methods like Maximum Likelihood and 
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only becomes available after the collapse of the USSR, circa 1990. 40 remaining countries 
were removed because these were missing an entire time series for either energy 
consumption per capita or for economic growth per capita. The final criteria applied for this 
sample was whether a country was a net energy importer.4 29 countries which were net 
energy exporters for each of the years 1981-2013 were excluded. The resulting sample 
contained the following 35 emerging economies with data from 1981-2013: 
 
 
1. Albania 8. China 15. India 22. Nicaragua 29. Thailand 
2. Bangladesh 9. Costa Rica 16. Jamaica 23. Pakistan 30. Togo 
3. Benin 10. Dom. Rep. 17. Jordan 24. Panama 31. Tunisia 
4. Botswana 11. Ethiopia 18. Kenya 25. Paraguay 32. Turkey 
5. Brazil 12. El Salvador 19. Mauritius 26. Philippines 33. Uruguay 
6. Bulgaria 13. Guatemala 20. Morocco 27. Senegal 34. Zambia 
7. Chile 14. Honduras 21. Nepal 28. Sri Lanka 35. Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
                                                 
Multiple Imputation are often unbiased with NMAR data even when our assumption is that the data is 
MAR, these methods result in standard errors being biased downward. Humphries, M. Missing data 
& how to deal: An overview of missing data [PDF document]. Retrieved from 
http://liberalarts.utexas.edu/prc/_files/cs/Missing-Data.pdf 
 4 Net energy imports are estimated as energy use less production, both measured in oil 
equivalents. A negative value indicates that the country is a net exporter. Energy use refers to use of 
primary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels, which is equal to indigenous production 
plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and fuels supplied to ships and aircraft engaged in 
international transport. 
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The sample has the following characteristics: 
1. Emerging or developing economies 
2. Balanced Panel 
3. Data5 is “long and wide”, meaning both sufficient number of cross-section units and 
years, N (35) and T (33)6 
4. GDP share of 35 nations in the sample is 23.16% of the 2014 total global GDP 
5. Population share of 35 nations in the sample is 53.09% of the 2014 total global 
population 
Variables: economic growth and energy consumption  
In order to be consistent with previous research, economic growth or performance is being 
measured through gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (constant 2005 US$).7 Also, 
since most econometric studies measure energy consumption in Kilogram(s) of oil equivalent 
per capita, the same measure is being used in this research.8 Most econometric studies that 
estimate the relationship between economic growth and energy consumption use the log-log 
                                                 
 5 World Bank data on the variables was downloaded from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) website. 
 6 One of the desirable properties of panel data is that both cross-section units and the number 
of years should be large. If both are large then the panel data is said to “long and wide.” Source: Hill, 
Griffiths & Lim (2012).  
 7 There is a consensus among economic development scholars that economic performance is 
best captured by per capita figures as opposed to just real GDP. Per-capita figures are divided 
by total country population at mid-year. By incorporating population figures, per capita 
figures provide the necessary correction to economic performance indicators, which may, 
otherwise, appear rosy in real terms (“Grossly distorted picture”, 2008). 
 8 “Kilogram(s) of oil equivalent, usually abbreviated as KGOE, is a normalized unit of 
energy. By convention it is equivalent to the approximate amount of energy that can be extracted 
from one kilogram of crude oil. It is a standardized unit, assigned a net calorific value of 41,868 
kilojoules/kg and may be used to compare energy from different sources.” Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Glossary:Kilograms_of_oil_equivalent_(kg
oe) 
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model specification as it said to best represent the nature of the relationship. For this reason, 
these variables were transformed into natural logarithms.9  
TESTS: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION  
Panel unit root tests 
 
The analysis of the dataset began with testing stationarity in a couple of time series, namely 
log of ECON— GDP per capita in (constant 2005 US$)—and log of ENER—Energy Use per 
capita in KGOE per capita.10 Since there is considerable heterogeneity across countries in the 
sample, tests that allow for individual unit roots processes to vary across cross-sections were 
employed.11 Panel unit root results showed that the null hypothesis of unit root could not be 
rejected in levels for both time series (Table 1 and Table 2). This meant that causal 
inferences from the two series could not be investigated. For this reason, the two logarithmic 
series were differenced and panel unit roots tests were carried out on the two series in first 
differences. Results from these panel unit root tests clearly demonstrated that the null 
hypothesis of unit root could be rejected, meaning that that the two series were stationary in 
first differences, or I (1)—integrated of order one (Table 3 and Table 4). The results of the 
panel unit root tests can also be verified by the shape of the individual cross-section or 
                                                 
 9Transforming variables into natural logarithms offers some advantages. For instance, it is 
easy to see that both GDP per capita and energy consumption per capita cannot really be zero or take 
negative values. For this reason, transforming these two variables to natural logarithms is appropriate 
since natural logarithms are only defined for all positive non-zero numbers. Moreover, transforming 
variables into natural logarithms also provides an indirect benefit in that the coefficients of the log-log 
model are elasticities which assist with understanding the percent quantity response in the dependent 
variable for every one percent change in the quantity of the independent variable, on average.   
 10 Generally, studies do not make a distinction between individual or identical unit root 
processes, which becomes important in the context of panel unit root testing. As mentioned earlier, 
panel unit roots tests increase the power of unit roots tests, however, only a few of these tests can be 
used for panel unit root testing as only some of the unit roots tests allow for individual unit root 
processes, or for the unit root process to vary across cross-sections. 
 11 Im, Pesaran and Shin, as well as the Fisher-ADF and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests allow 
for variation in unit root processes and thus are relevant in our case. 
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country-level graphs that capture the trends in economic growth and energy consumption and 
show that while the time series are not stationary in levels, they become so in first differences 
(Figure 1 and Figure 2).12 
Table 1: Panel unit root test: LN_ENER – in levels 
Panel unit root test: Summary      
Series:  LN_ENER        
Sample: 1981 2013     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends     
Automatic selection of maximum lags     
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 5     
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel     
     
      Cross-  
Method   Statistic  Prob. sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)      
Levin, Lin & Chu t  3.24279   0.9994  35  1108 
Breitung t-stat   3.55201   0.9998  35  1073 
      
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)      
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 2.39087 0.9916  35  1108 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  60.9634   0.7710  35  1108 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  53.1589   0.9331  35  1120    
       
 Table 2: Panel unit root test:  LN_ECON – in levels 
Panel unit root test: Summary      
Series:  LN_ECON        
Sample: 1981 2013     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends     
Automatic selection of maximum lags     
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 6     
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel     
  
       Cross-  
Method   Statistic  Prob. sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)      
Levin, Lin & Chu t -0.23591  0.4067  35  1083 
Breitung t-stat   7.99107   1.0000  35  1048 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)      
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 1.23896 0.8923  35  1083 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  72.0971   0.4084  35  1083 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  95.2793   0.0240  35  112 
                                                 
 12 Figure 1 captures the trends in economic growth per capita (constant 2005 US$) and energy 
consumption (KGOE) from 1981-2013 for the 35 countries in the sample. Figure 1, which is in 
natural logarithms shows that the trends are not stationary. Figure 2 that captures the same trends 
indicates that both variables become stationary in first differences. 
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Table 3: Panel unit root test: LN_ENER – in first differences 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary      
Series:  D(LN_ENER)        
Sample: 1981 2013     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends     
Automatic selection of maximum lags     
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 5     
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel     
     
      Cross-  
Method   Statistic  Prob. sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)      
Levin, Lin & Chu t -19.4229  0.0000  35  1069 
Breitung t-stat  -9.27165  0.0000  35  1034 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)      
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -21.7116  0.0000  35  1069 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square     531.038  0.0000  35  1069 
PP - Fisher Chi-square     848.188  0.0000  35  1085     
 .     
 
Table 4: Panel unit root test: LN_ECON – in first differences 
Panel unit root test: Summary      
Series:  D(LN_ECON)         
Sample: 1981 2013     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends     
Automatic selection of maximum lags     
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 4     
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel     
     
      Cross-  
Method   Statistic  Prob. sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)      
Levin, Lin & Chu t -17.5265  0.0000  35  1066 
Breitung t-stat  -7.70348  0.0000  35  1031 
      
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)      
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -18.3028 0.0000  35  1066 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  508.111   0.0000  35  1066 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  967.261   0.0000  35  1085 
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Figure 2: Economic growth per capita (constant 2005 US$; dashes); Energy consumption per capita (KGOE; 
heavy line) for 35 countries (country names in ISO 3166-1 alpha 3) 1981–2013 in Natural Logarithms (Source: 
World Development Indicators, The World Bank) 
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Figure 3: Economic growth per capita (constant 2005 US$; dashed); Energy consumption per capita (KGOE; 
heavy line) for 35 countries (country names in ISO 3166-1 alpha 3) 1981–2013 in Log differences (Source: World 
Development Indicators, The World Bank 
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Panel cointegration  
The next step in the investigation was to check for the presence of cointegration or a long-run 
relationship or association between the two series. If the variables y1, y2 and y3 are I (1) and 
the linear combination et=β0+β1y1+β2y2+β3y3 is stationary, then the three variables are said 
to be cointegrated of order (1,1). In other words, “[c]ointegrated variables share the same 
stochastic trends and so cannot drift too far apart” (Enders, 2004, p.372). This long-run 
relationship can be tested through panel cointegration tests, some of which have been 
developed by Pedroni (1999).13  
Pedroni identifies seven different statistics for the panel cointegration test. These 
include: i) panel ν-statistic; ii) panel rho-statistic; iii) panel PP-statistic; iv) panel ADF-
statistic; v) group rho-statistic; vi) group PP-statistic; vii) group ADF-statistic. The first four 
statistics are based on the “within” approach and are known as panel cointegration statistics. 
The last three statistics are known as the group panel cointegration statistics and are based on 
the “between” approach. It should be noted that “[t]he panel ν-test is a one sided test where 
large positive value reject the null of no cointegration. For the remaining statistics, large 
negative values reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration” (Ouedraogo, 2013, p.641). 
Pedroni panel cointegration test was conducted (Table 5). Results of Pedroni 
cointegration test revealed positive value for panel ν-test as well as negative values for all the 
other six statistics, thus establishing that that LN_ECON and LN_ENER were cointegrated. 
Cointegration between LN_ECON and LN_ENER was also established using Johansen-
Fisher Panel Cointegration Test (Table 6). Results from this test established that the null of 
                                                 
 13 There are two types of tests available for cointegration testing in panel data; two are based 
on Engle-Granger (1987) methodology, while the third test is the Johansen–Fisher Panel 
Cointegration test.  
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no long-term relationship between the variables can be rejected, while the null that there is at 
least one cointegrating relationship between the two series cannot be rejected. The results 
from the two panel cointegration tests show that both of these series share similar stochastic 
trends, that is, they never diverge too far from each other.14 
Table 5: Pedroni Panel Cointegration Test (Engle-Granger-based) 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test      
Series: LN_ECON LN_ENER           
Sample: 1981 2013      
Included observations: 1155      
Cross-sections included: 35      
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration      
Trend assumption: Deterministic intercept and trend      
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 7      
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel      
      
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension)      
        Weighted  
   Statistic   Prob. Statistic  Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic  5.673210  0.0000  4.100716  0.0000 
Panel rho-Statistic 0.240019  0.5948 -1.254849  0.1048 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.039463  0.0207 -3.842347  0.0001 
Panel ADF-Statistic -1.660467  0.0484 -3.097793  0.0010 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension)      
      
   Statistic  Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic -0.035142  0.4860   
Group PP-Statistic -3.626639  0.0001   
Group ADF-Statistic -3.235684  0.0006   
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 14 In short, the results for cointegration are fairly conclusive as both Pedroni and Fisher tests 
for cointegration point out that LN_ECON and LN_ENER are cointegrated.  
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Table 6: Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test  
 
Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test     
Series: LN_ECON LN_ENER    
Sample: 1981 2013     
Included observations: 1155     
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted)     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 1     
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue)     
     
Hypothesized Fisher Stat.*   Fisher Stat.*  
No. of CE(s) (from trace test) Prob.  (from max-eigen test) Prob. 
      
None   110.0   0.0016   103.9    0.0053 
At most 1  55.05   0.9048   55.05    0.9048 
     
* Probabilities are computed using asymptotic Chi-square distribution.     
    .      
    
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Given that the variables of interest, economic growth and energy consumption are 
cointegrated, a VECM is employed (Table 7) in order to investigate the long-term 
relationship as well as the error correction terms.15 The following bivariate VECM is 
estimated—this is a system of equations (3): 16 
 
∆ =  +    
!
 
Δ +  " 
!
 
∆#$ + % #& +   ' 
                                                 
 15 Both VECM and VAR are related.  Just like a VECM, both variables are treated 
symmetrically in a bivariate VAR model, which leads some important benefits: First, issues arising of 
endogeneity, specifically simultaneity, are not an issue in VECM/VAR models because all variables 
in the model are a priori endogenous. Second, OLS yields consistent and efficient estimates—
estimates are equal to Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimates—only for VAR though. VECM is a 
special type of VAR; as a matter of fact, VECM is often referred to as a restricted VAR.  
 16 Lag selection criteria: When running the VECM model between energy consumption and 
economic growth the question arises as to what should be the criteria for lag selection. There are two 
ways to answer this question. The first is to go with convention and to choose 1 or, at most, 2 lags for 
data that is annual (Woolridge, 2000). There are specific lag selection criteria that can be employed in 
EViews; all of which minimize one of the various criteria like Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); 
Schwarz Information Criterion (SC); and Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HC). For this 
research, I have chosen to go with 2 lags since data is annual. 
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Weak and Strong Granger causality 
VECM is an effective framework for testing two types of Granger causality. If the 
coefficients of system variable k are significant for the equation of system variable j, then 
variable k is said to Granger cause variable j. (Masih & Masih, 1996). This is also referred to 
as “weak Granger causality” and it shows how a dependent variable responds to short-term 
shocks to the stochastic environment (Ouedraogo, 2013).17 “Strong Granger causality” entails 
carrying out joint tests of significance (Wald test) for the coefficient of the error correction 
term (long-run causality) and coefficients of the lagged variables (Ouedraogo, 2013, p. 642). 
 
Long-run causality through the error correction term 
In (3), the coefficients λ1 and λ2 are known as error correction coefficients and they show by 
how much (magnitude) ∆  and ∆#$ respond to the cointegrating error term, 
respectively. Put another way, the error correction coefficients represent the speed at which 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium are eliminated following distortions or changes in 
each variable. Overall, changes in the endogenous variables in the system are not only caused 
by the changes in their lags but by previous period’s disequilibrium.  
Long-run causality is assessed “…by examining the significance of the speed of 
adjustment, which is the coefficient of the error correction term…” (Ouedraogo, 2013, 
                                                 
 17 Stochastic, as opposed to deterministic, environment always contains some level of 
randomness. 
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p.642). To assess long-run causality, the relevant model (below) was estimated via LS (Table 
8). 
∆ =  +    
!
 
Δ +  " 
!
 
∆#$ + % #& + '      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  87
Table 7: Vector Error Correction Model (GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$); Energy consumption per capita 
(KGOE) in natural logarithms  
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates     
 Sample (adjusted): 1984 2013   
 Included observations: 1050 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  
   
LN_ENER(-1)   1.000000  
   
LN_ECON(-1)  -0.543539  
    (0.10556)  
   [-5.14898]  
   
@TREND(81)  -0.000720  
    (0.00031) 
   [-2.32342]  
   
C   -2.059562    
Error Correction:  D(LN_ENER) D(LN_ECON) 
   
CointEq1   -0.013315  0.000271 
    (0.00319)  (0.00259) 
   [-4.16958] [ 0.10471] 
   
D(LN_ENER(-1))   0.001819 -0.002185 
    (0.03402)  (0.02762) 
   [ 0.05347] [-0.07910] 
   
D(LN_ENER(-2))  -0.010062  0.008356 
    (0.03394)  (0.02755) 
   [-0.29647] [ 0.30326] 
   
D(LN_ECON(-1))   0.262524   0.350438 
    (0.04144)  (0.03364) 
   [ 6.33463] [ 10.4159] 
   
D(LN_ECON(-2))   0.063566   0.076799 
    (0.04126)  (0.03350) 
   [ 1.54044] [ 2.29251]   
C    0.006421  0.013277 
    (0.00172)  (0.00139) 
   [ 3.74225] [ 9.53099]   
 R-squared   0.077350   0.158544 
 Adj. R-squared   0.072931   0.154514 
 Sum sq. resids   2.491819   1.642294 
 S.E. equation   0.048855  0.039662 
 F-statistic   17.50470   39.34124 
 Log likelihood   1682.969   1901.852 
 Akaike AIC  -3.194227 -3.611146 
 Schwarz SC  -3.165904 -3.582823 
 Mean dependent   0.013024   0.022139 
 S.D. dependent   0.050740   0.043134   
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  3.08E-06 
 Determinant resid covariance   3.05E-06 
 Log likelihood     3688.455 
 Akaike information criterion   -6.997057 
 Schwarz criterion    -6.926249  
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Table 8: Vector Error Correction Model (GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$); Energy 
consumption per capita (KGOE) in natural logarithms 
 
System: UNTITLED     
Estimation Method: Least Squares        
Sample: 1984 2013     
Included observations: 1050     
Total system (balanced) observations 2100     
     
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic  Prob.   
     
C(1)  -0.014599 0.003565  -4.094498 0.0000 
C(2)  0.006992  0.033974  0.205804  0.8370 
C(3)  -0.005843 0.033913  -0.172281 0.8632 
C(4)  0.253547  0.041425  6.120666  0.0000 
C(5)  0.054385  0.041206  1.319811  0.1870 
C(6)  0.012565  0.002257  5.567921  0.0000 
C(7)  -0.002996 0.002892  -1.035955 0.3003 
C(8)  -0.003092 0.027559  -0.112208 0.9107 
C(9)  0.007607  0.027510  0.276509  0.7822 
C(10) 0.350154  0.033603  10.42029  0.0000 
C(11) 0.077194  0.033426  2.309417  0.0210 
C(12) 0.014506  0.001831  7.924056  0.0000 
     
Determinant residual covariance  3.06E-06   
        
Equation: D(LN_ENER) = C(1)*( LN_ENER(-1) - 0.543538847323     
        *LN_ECON(-1) - 0.0007197474818*@TREND(81) - 2.05956212019 )      
        + C(2)*D(LN_ENER(-1)) + C(3)*D(LN_ENER(-2)) + C(4)*D(LN_ECON(     
        -1)) + C(5)*D(LN_ECON(-2)) + C(6)     
Observations:   1050     
R-squared  0.076810     Mean dependent var  0.013024 
Adjusted R-squared 0.072389     S.D. dependent var  0.050740 
S.E. of regression 0.048869     Sum squared resid  2.493277 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.994960    
     
Equation: D(LN_ECON) = C(7)*( LN_ENER(-1) - 0.543538847323     
        *LN_ECON(-1) - 0.0007197474818*@TREND(81) - 2.05956212019 )      
        + C(8)*D(LN_ENER(-1)) + C(9)*D(LN_ENER(-2)) + C(10)     
        *D(LN_ECON(-1)) + C(11)*D(LN_ECON(-2)) + C(12)     
Observations:   1050     
R-squared  0.159399     Mean dependent var  0.022139 
Adjusted R-squared 0.155373     S.D. dependent var  0.043134 
S.E. of regression 0.039642     Sum squared resid  1.640624 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.988333    
     
  
 
Short/Long run and Weak/Strong Granger causality results 
For the short run, or the weak Granger causality test, results (Table 9) show that the null 
hypothesis of no relationship cannot be rejected for energy consumption growth Granger 
causing economic growth, while the null of no relationship is rejected for economic growth 
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Granger causing energy consumption growth, meaning that in the short run economic growth 
Granger causes energy consumption growth and not vice versa. In other words, there is an 
evidentiary basis to conclude that in the sample of 35 emerging economies, which are net 
energy importers, economic growth Granger causes energy consumption growth in the years 
1981-2013.  
 
Table 9: Weak Panel Granger Causality Test (Short run)18 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests    
    
Sample: 1981 2013    
Lags: 2    
    
 Null Hypothesis:     Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
 LN_ECON does not Granger Cause LN_ENER  1085  34.3469  3.E-15 
 LN_ENER does not Granger Cause LN_ECON   0.05842  0.9433 
         
 For the long run, both the sign and the significance of the coefficient of the error 
correction term determine the relationship between economic growth and energy 
consumption growth. The results from Table 8 show the sign and significance of the 
coefficient of the error correction term (C1). The negative sign indicates that the system 
converges to an equilibrium in the long run. At the same time, the p-value of the error 
correction term’s coefficient (C1) indicates that the equilibrium between economic growth 
and energy consumption growth in the long run is significant, meaning that the observed 
                                                 
 18 This panel Granger Causality test treats panel data as one stacked dataset, while not letting 
data from one cross-section to enter the lagged values of data from the next cross-section. This 
method assumes that coefficients are the same across all cross-sections. Another method of testing for 
panel Granger Causality has been developed by Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) that assumes different 
coefficients across the cross-sections. The results from the second approach also show that the null 
hypothesis of LN_ECON does not cause LN_ENER can be rejected while vice is not versa. 
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relationship between economic growth and energy consumption growth is not just the result 
of random chance.  
Test 10: Strong Granger causality (Joint Short/Long) 
Wald Test:    
System: Untitled    
    
Test Statistic   Value  df Probability 
    
Chi-square    65.94327  3  0.0000    
    
Null Hypothesis: C(1)=C(4)=C(5)=0    
Null Hypothesis Summary:       
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value  Std. Err. 
    
C(1)    -0.014599  0.003565 
C(4)     0.253547  0.041425 
C(5)     0.054385  0.041206    
   
 
To test for strong Granger causality, short and long-run causality are tested together 
in a joint Wald test (Table 10). Results show that the null hypothesis of no relationship 
between economic growth and energy consumption growth can be rejected, thus establishing 
what is known as “strong causality” between economic growth and energy consumption 
growth. In other words, according to the results of the various causality tests, for the sample 
of 35 emerging economies, economic growth Granger causes energy consumption growth in 
both the short and the long run.  
Fixed-effects v. random-effects  
Due to concerns arising of omitted variable bias due to unobserved heterogeneity, it is 
important to check the appropriateness of a random-effects model compared to a fixed-
effects model. The Hausman test can assist in choosing between random or fixed-effects 
panel regression. In panel data comprising 35 different countries that have different variances 
both in terms of economic performance per capita as well as in terms of energy consumption 
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per capita, the of use fixed-effects estimation is recommended in order to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity or time-invariant differences (Torres-Reyna, 2007). 
 
Table 11: OLS (Random effects)    
Dependent Variable: LN_ENER  
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)       
Sample: 1981 2013     
Periods included: 33     
Cross-sections included: 35     
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1155     
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances     
White period standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction)     
     
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C   2.221067  0.489385 4.538486 0.0000 
LN_ECON  0.578372  0.062166 9.303656 0.0000 
     
Effects Specification    
     S.D.    Rho   
     
Cross-section random   0.397699 0.9159 
Idiosyncratic random   0.120518 0.0841 
     
Weighted Statistics    
     
R-squared  0.643656     Mean dependent var  0.338756 
Adjusted R-squared 0.643347     S.D. dependent var  0.202260 
S.E. of regression 0.120791     Sum squared resid  16.82274 
F-statistic  2082.637     Durbin-Watson stat  0.136991 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000    
      
Unweighted Statistics    
     
R-squared  0.425928     Mean dependent var  6.430574 
Sum squared resid 220.5294     Durbin-Watson stat  0.010450  
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Table 12: Hausman Test 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test     
Equation: Untitled     
Test cross-section random effects     
     
Test Summary   Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
Cross-section random  6.222429  1 0.0126 
     
     
Cross-section random effects test comparisons:     
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
LN_ECON 0.584028 0.578372 0.000005 0.0126    
 
 
  In order to assess whether to use random effects or fixed-effects model, a random-
effects model was first estimated (Table 11). The appropriateness of a random-effects model 
was checked through performing a Hausman test (Table 12). The null hypothesis in the 
Hausman test takes random-effects as the preferred method over fixed-effects model. The 
results of the Hausman test clearly show that random-effects model is not the appropriate 
choice for this estimation and for this reason, a fixed-effects model should be estimated. 19 
 
Controlling for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
 If the assumption of homoskedastic variances is violated, then it leads one to conclude that 
the least squares estimators are not Best, Linear and Unbiased (BLUE)—specifically, least 
squares estimators are not efficient or asymptotically efficient. What this means is that 
standard errors would generally be underestimated in models that suffer from 
                                                 
 19 Moreover, it has been suggested that running an OLS estimation in first differences versus 
fixed-effects estimation is an either-or choice and that one needs to be careful with the use of fixed-
effects estimation in cases where N is small compared to T as fixed-effects estimator relies on N∞ 
for its large-sample justification. 
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heteroscedasticity, leading to invalid statistical inference. Since there are 35 different 
countries in the sample, it is very likely that there are substantial differences in the different 
cross-sectional observations—heteroskedastic variances.  
If the assumption of independent disturbances is violated, coefficient estimates suffer 
from the problem of autocorrelated disturbances or serial correlation. What this problem 
implies is that disturbances occurring at one point in time are impacted by disturbances 
occurring in prior periods. The consequences of serial correlation are identical to the 
presence of heteroskedasticity, meaning that the least squares estimators are neither BLUE, 
efficient or asymptotically efficient.  Presence of serial correlation lead to standard errors 
being smaller; which, in turn, renders statistical inference invalid.  
Employing a weighted least squares (WLS) procedure (Table 13) controls for the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. However, value of the Durbin-Watson test (Table 13) 
indicates that there is no need to control for autocorrelation. Autocorrelation was also 
checked via Portmanteau test and the results show no autocorrelation (Table 14). 
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Table 13: OLS Panel estimation (Weighted Least Squares) 
Dependent Variable: D_LN_ENER     
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)       
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2013     
Periods included: 32     
Cross-sections included: 35     
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1120     
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 0.003255 0.001042 3.124878 0.0018 
D_LN_ECON 0.453051 0.023813 19.02575 0.0000 
     
 Weighted Statistics    
     
R-squared  0.244584     Mean dependent var  0.016320 
Adjusted R-squared 0.24390          S.D. dependent var  0.051719 
S.E. of regression  0.044440     Sum squared resid  2.207997 
F-statistic  361.9792     Durbin-Watson stat  1.985787 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000        
  
Table 14: Portmanteau Test  
VEC Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations      
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h     
Sample: 1981 2013      
Included observations: 1050      
      
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj  Q-Stat  Prob.  df 
      
1  0.191382 NA*  0.191564 NA*  NA* 
2  1.497480 NA*  1.500155 NA*  NA* 
3  12.27455 0.0919  12.30810  0.0909  7 
      
*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order.      
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FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Results of the short and long-run dynamics show (Table 10, Strong Granger causality) that in 
the sample of 35 net energy-importing emerging economies, economic growth Granger causes 
energy consumption growth in the period 1981-2013. Moreover, country-level scatter plots 
(Figure 3) indicate that in the sample of 35 emerging economies, the relationship between GDP 
per capita and energy consumption per capita is somewhat linear when using Nearest Neighbor 
algorithm for plotting. Nearest-neighbor regression estimators is one nonparametric technique 
of estimating the shape of the regression curve when there is not much a priori knowledge 
available on its shape (Altman, 1992). What this points out is that in the sample of 35 net 
energy importing emerging economies, economic growth and energy consumption are rising 
together in the period 1981-2013. This finding contradicts the EKC-hypothesis that postulates 
a curvilinear (inverted U-shape) between income and pollution. It can also be concluded from 
these findings that in the presence of economic growth in emerging economies in the future, 
energy consumption growth is likely to keep increasing.  
These results will serve to assist policymakers in two ways: First, highlighting the 
causal mechanism between economic growth and energy consumption growth will lead to the 
realization that if these emerging economies want to economically grow and prevent climate 
change, they need to explore alternative sources—non-fossil—of energy. In other words, 
since these findings provide evidence to suggest that since there is no EKC in the case of 35 
emerging economies, these nations will have to find ways to arrest rising levels of 
environmental degradation and climate change through shifting to renewables-based energy 
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systems. According to the IEA, to prevent a rise of 2°C in the global temperature,20 the 
concentration of atmospheric CO2 must be clamped near 450 parts per million (ppm).21 As 
this dissertation goes to the printer, the concentration of atmospheric CO2 has crossed 405 
ppm, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)-operated 
Mauna Loa Observatory that began taking measurements in 1958.22  
Second, the results from this research will guide policymakers towards better 
macroeconomic policies in emerging economies. Chapter 2 outlined different ways in which 
a rising energy import bill can quickly become unsustainable for emerging economies—the 
1990/91 Indian balance-of-payments crisis was presented as a case. There is still a need to 
carefully monitor energy imports in emerging economies. For instance, in 2015, India was 
the fourth-largest consumer of oil after United States, China and Japan. According to the 
EIA, India is still heavily dependent on Middle-Eastern oil.23 Considering this research, 
Indian policymakers would be best advised to carefully monitor energy import numbers, 
especially as India’s economy is poised for rapid growth of 7.5% in 2016.24    
Finally, and most importantly, this analysis casts doubt on the validity of the EKC-
hypothesis, especially in the context of 35 net energy-importing emerging economies. If there 
is a positive and significant causal relationship between economic growth and energy 
consumption growth—meaning that economic growth drives energy consumption—pollution 
                                                 
 20 This increase is above pre-industrial (circa 1780) mean global temperature. At the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution CO2 concentration was about 280 ppm. Source: 
https://scripps.ucsd.edu/programs/keelingcurve/2015/05/12/what-does-this-number-mean/ 
 21 Source: http://www.iea.org/publications/scenariosandprojections/ 
 22 The measurements of atmospheric CO2 is also known as the Keeling curve. CO2 
concentration was 317 ppm in 1958. Source: 
https://scripps.ucsd.edu/programs/keelingcurve/2015/05/12/what-does-this-number-mean/ 
 23 Source: http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=IND 
 24 Source: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2016/car030216a.htm 
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intensity (a proxy for fossil fuel-based energy consumption) is likely to keep growing in 
these emerging economies for the foreseeable future. Results from individual country-level 
scatter plots also show that, in fact, the relationship between economic growth and energy 
consumption growth is linear—not curvilinear as postulated by the EKC-hypothesis. 
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Figure 4: Economic growth per capita (constant 2005 US$; horizontal axis); Energy consumption per capita 
(KGOE; vertical axis) for 35 countries (country names in ISO 3166-1 alpha 3) 1981–2013 in Natural Logarithms 
and First Differences (Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank) 
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CONCLUSION 
Some energy policy positions based on econometric studies, are close corollaries of the EKC 
literature. Chief among them are the so-called Neutrality Hypothesis and the Growth 
Hypothesis. The Neutrality Hypothesis argues that there is no correlation between economic 
growth and energy consumption. Consequently, there are no policy implications of expansive 
or conservative energy consumption. Using econometric methods, the Growth Hypothesis 
argues that, in fact, energy consumption drives economic growth and that any policies that 
seek to curtail the use of fossil fuel-based energy consumption will adversely impact 
economic growth. The results of this analysis, however, find for the “Conservation 
Hypothesis.” For the countries in this panel, the evidence is that economic growth Granger 
causes energy consumption growth and not vice versa, so that conserving energy 
consumption may not have an adverse impact on economic growth in neither the short nor 
the long run. 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH PLANS 
 
Scientific evidence shows various alarming manifestations of rapid climate change. According 
to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)-operated Mauna Loa 
Observatory, the concentration of atmospheric CO2 has crossed 406 ppm.1NOAA has also 
found 2016 to be the hottest year since scientists started tracking global temperatures in 1880—
earth has now had three consecutive years of record-breaking heat (NOAA, 2017). According 
to President Obama, “[t]he release of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) due to human activity is increasing global average surface temperatures, disrupting 
weather patterns, and acidifying the ocean” (Obama, 2017). In other words, we are in a climate 
emergency. 
Global climate change patterns are following a dangerous trajectory. “Turn Down the 
Heat,” (2012-14) a series of reports by the World Bank, which focus on climate change’s 
impact on ecosystems and livelihoods make three startling conclusions: First, the world is on 
track for a 4oC increase in global temperature by the end of this century. Second, even a 2oC 
increase in global mean temperature by the middle of this century, will result in devastating 
impact on food production in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and South East Asia. Last, an 
increase of 1.5oC in the global mean temperature is already locked into the earth’s atmosphere 
by 2050. In plain speak, given various interactions between biological, hydrological and 
geological ecosystems, rapid climate change could trigger non-linear dynamics within the 
                                                 
1 The measurements of atmospheric CO2 are also known as the Keeling curve. CO2 
concentration was 317 ppm in 1958. Source: 
https://scripps.ucsd.edu/programs/keelingcurve/2015/05/12/what-does-this-number-mean/ 
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earth’s climate system (Burkett et al., 2005). Consequently, climate conditions and weather 
extremes, considered highly unusual or unprecedented, would become the “new climate 
normal”—a world of increased risks and instability.   
Fossil fuel consumption has been known to be one of the drivers of climate change 
for a long time.2 Most research on the subject, however, has only focus on advanced 
economies of the world like the United States, where since 1975 fossil fuel consumption has 
been slowing in comparison to economic growth—energy consumption and economic 
growth are said to be “decoupling.” This decoupling or delinking of relationship between 
energy consumption and economic growth is another version of the EKC-hypothesis.  
Based on this decoupling in advanced economies, policymakers in emerging 
economies have claimed that there is no need to worry about climate change given the 
slowdown in fossil fuel consumption. Alarmingly, “[i]n developing countries, some 
policymakers have interpreted the EKC/decoupling thesis as conveying a message about 
priorities: Grow first, then clean up” (Dasgupta, Laplante, Wang & Wheeler, 2002, p.147). 
The literature known as “Energy-GDP nexus” is composed of studies that have sought to 
assess the EKC/decoupling-hypothesis by carrying out tests of Granger causality. However, 
scientific data from developing countries like India clearly shows that economic growth and 
fossil fuel consumption have both been increasing together. 
This dissertation focused on understanding the relationship between economic growth 
and fossil fuel consumption in emerging economies. Realizing that emerging economies were 
different from advanced economies, this dissertation used both qualitative and quantitative 
                                                 
 2 Svante Arrhenius (1896) study titled “On the influence of carbonic acid in the air on the 
temperature on the ground” is considered one of the first scientific studies to establish the connection 
between fossil fuels and climate change. 
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data to trace the connections between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption. 
It was found that in the wider economic literature there is no agreement on whether fossil 
fuel consumption is declining in the emerging economies. Based on the findings of this 
interdisciplinary research policymakers interested in forestalling climate change may want to 
contemplate using policy architecture to bring about a change in fossil fuel-based energy 
system. This dissertation’s results also indicate that given the nature of present economic 
manufacturing processes in emerging economies, fossil fuel consumption will keep on 
increasing in the in these countries for many years to come. The most important implication 
of this dissertation is that it provides a rationale for switching from fossil fuels to renewable 
sources of energy in 35 net energy-importing emerging economies.  
 Overall, this dissertation is motivated by the plethora of evidence indicating rapid 
climate change, impending economic and social disruptions as well as by the absence of 
research regarding EKC/decoupling hypothesis in the context of net energy-importing 
emerging economies. Specifically, this dissertation investigated three different facets of the 
relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy consumption through 
interrelated chapters. The first of these chapters started with a major puzzle in economic 
history: why did the Industrial Revolution start in Western Europe? The chapter showed that 
mainstream explanations for this puzzle generally assign a pride of place to institutional—
secure property rights—and technological innovations—steam engine. Using 
interdisciplinary sources, the chapter argued that mainstream explanations are based on 
narrow empirics. At the same time, the same chapter argued that explanations emanating out 
of mainstream economics show philosophical ignorance in failing to provide a moral 
appraisal with respect to whether distributive outcomes are fair, just or equitable. More 
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importantly, the chapter showed that during the Industrial Revolution switching from water 
to fossil fuel-based energy sources was not based on economic considerations since water 
was neither scare nor more expensive than coal. Placing the Glorious Revolution on the same 
historical continuum as the Industrial Revolution through their common link with enclosures, 
the chapter argued that the real reasons behind switching to fossil fuels were political-
economic. The energy switch was driven by the landlord/industrial class’s desire to maintain 
its bargaining power and retain its lion share of the surplus. Finally, the chapter advanced 
two models that illustrated the political-economic nature of both institutional and 
technological change in Britain: 1) Critical-Institutionalism 2) Fossil-Capital. Critical-
Institutionalism explained the events of the Glorious Revolution through the interplay of the 
distribution of resources, culture and agency. Fossil-Capital demonstrated how fossil fuels 
became an integral part of production in capitalist or monetary production economies largely 
due to political-economic considerations. 
 The preceding chapter connects with the rest of this dissertation by exploring the 
historical antecedents of the relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel energy 
consumption. The most significant message coming out of this chapter is that the “invisible 
hand” or unfettered markets did not bring about a switch in energy systems during the 
Industrial Revolution; rather, energy system switch was the deliberate action of a coalition—
the visible hands of a few, if you will. In other words, the lower cost of coal—coal-based 
energy remained more expensive than water-based energy—did not automatically bring 
about the switch in energy systems during the Industrial Revolution. An important 
implication is that these findings open a possibility for emerging economies’ policymakers, 
who are concerned about the link between climate change and fossil fuels, to contemplate a 
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policy-led untethering between economic growth and fossil fuels—as opposed to waiting for 
the invisible hand to spring into action. 
 This third chapter added toward understanding the relationship between economic 
growth and energy consumption and served as a launch pad for the econometric analysis of 
the relationship in chapter four. The third chapter highlighted some of the shortcomings of 
the EKC literature, especially with respect to emerging economies. The third chapter also 
detailed some of the different mechanisms that link economic growth to energy consumption, 
especially in the context of emerging economies. The most important lesson of the third 
chapter is the need to understand the relationship between economic growth and energy 
consumption in the case of net energy-importing emerging economies because the constant 
requirement to import energy creates unique challenges for these economies. The unending 
want for trade finance for importing energy creates unrelenting stress on the external account 
in emerging economies. This stress, in turn, leads to multiple macroeconomic problems for 
net energy-importing emerging economies that could include loss of control over monetary 
policy or exchange rate or full-scale financial instability. The third chapter outlined different 
ways in which a rising energy import bill can quickly become unsustainable for net energy-
importing emerging economies—the 1990/91 Indian balance-of-payments crisis is a case in 
point. This exposition of the link between energy import bills and significant macroeconomic 
problems will guide policymakers toward formulating better macroeconomic policies in 
emerging economies.  
The fourth chapter analyzed the relationship between economic growth and energy 
consumption growth in a sample of 35 net energy-importing emerging economies. Results of 
the short and long-run dynamics show that in the sample of 35 net energy-importing emerging 
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economies, economic growth Granger causes energy consumption growth in the period 1981-
2013. Moreover, country-level scatter plots indicate that in the sample of 35 emerging 
economies, the relationship between GDP per capita and energy consumption per capita is 
linear, when using K-Nearest Neighbor algorithm—and not curvilinear as postulated by the 
EKC-hypothesis. These findings indicate that in the presence of economic growth in emerging 
economies in the future, energy consumption growth is likely to keep increasing. The results 
from this chapter will serve to assist policymakers in two ways: First, highlighting the causal 
mechanism between economic growth and energy consumption growth will lead to better 
climate change mitigation policies. For instance, given the causal linkages between economic 
growth and energy consumption growth, these findings will create the necessary urgency on 
part of policymakers to find ways to shift to a renewables-based energy system. In other words, 
these findings provide evidence to suggest that since there is no EKC in the case of 35 emerging 
economies, these nations will have to find ways to arrest rising levels of environmental 
degradation and climate change.  
Finally, and most importantly, this analysis casts doubt on the validity of the EKC-
hypothesis, especially in the context of 35 net energy-importing emerging economies. If there 
is a positive and significant causal relationship between economic growth and energy 
consumption growth—meaning that economic growth drives energy consumption growth—
pollution intensity (a proxy for fossil fuel-based energy consumption) is likely to keep 
growing in these emerging economies for the foreseeable future. Results from individual 
country-level scatter plots also show that, in fact, the relationship between economic growth 
and energy consumption growth is linear—not curvilinear as postulated by the EKC-
hypothesis. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH PLANS 
This dissertation will lead to two distinct research directions in the immediate future. To 
corroborate the role of political economic reasons behind energy system switches more 
present-day research will be carried out. Recently, several countries, including Costa Rica, 
Sweden and Denmark, have taken the lead in moving away from a fossil fuels-based energy 
systems. This proposed research will be carried out by means of an in-depth study of a 
modern-day energy system switch in one of the mentioned countries. At the same time, the 
results of the empirical chapter will be checked for robustness in additional emerging 
countries. To this end, the countries that comprised the former Soviet Union will serve as a 
good starting point.  
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